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The law of personal jurisdiction lies at the heart of all litigation.2 Our courts must recognize 
the rights of individuals as well as the rights of corporations. The motto placed at the entrance of 
the United States Supreme Court—“Equal Justice Under Law”—ensures the promise of equal 
justice under the law to all persons.3 It expresses the ultimate responsibility of the Supreme Court 
of the United States (the “Court”) as the highest tribunal for all cases and controversies arising 
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States and functions as a guardian and 
interpreter of the Constitution.4 From the perspective of fairness, an individual needs protection 
without compromising a corporate defendant’s goals in advancing its business.  
The Court’s recent decisions in (1) Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,5 (2) 
Daimler AG v. Bauman,6 (3) J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,7 (4) BNSF Railway Co. v. 
                                                 
2  See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (7th ed. 2008) [hereinafter YEAZELL].  
3 The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited August 2017).  
4 Id. 
5 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).  
6 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
7 J. McIntyre Mach, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 
 




Tyrrell,8  and (5) Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. San Francisco Cty.9raise 
serious need for re-routing courts’ approaches to personal jurisdiction because majority approaches 
were biased against individuals and were inconsistent with the Court’s motto. The Court never 
adequately considered the difference between corporations of the pre-industrial era and those of 
the modern-industrial era. Many modern-era corporate structures are extremely complex and often 
expand into the global market by organizing themselves in an orb-web formation.10 Hence, the 
current analysis of jurisdictional law is the incorrect way to determine personal jurisdiction. To 
address this problem, this article explains the structure of orb-web corporations and offers three 
approaches to personal jurisdiction, emphasizing a presence model based on the birthplace of an 
orb-web corporation. This article advocates how our jurisdictional law can be re-routed to enhance 
fairness, all while assuring the Court’s motto in an orb-web corporation’s setting.11  
 
I. A TOUCHSTONE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS 
A. Established Models of Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Our Constitution requires that a forum state must have power over an out-of-state corporate 
defendant before the forum state or federal court located within the state can compel the defendant 
to come to the state to defend a lawsuit.12 The power theory rests on two prongs: (1) the due 
process,13 and (2) notice.14 Theoretically, state courts assert due process through two established 
models followed by proper and adequate notice:15 (1) presence model,16 or (2) minimum contacts 
model.17 Federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction and in addition to 
                                                 
8 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct 1549 (2017). 
9 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. Cal. San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)  
10 See infra Part I.C.  
11 See discussion infra Parts I -IV; see McIntyre, 864 U.S. at 892 (Breyer J., concurring) (“the fact that the 
defendant is a foreign, rather than a domestic, manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute rule yet more 
uncertain...the nature of international commerce has changed so significantly as to require a new approach to personal 
jurisdiction.”); see also Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see infra 
text and accompanying note 261.  
12 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (stating that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”). 
13 Id.; PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL 119 (13th ed. 2012) [hereinafter PETER 
HAY] (“The personal jurisdiction of the State court is limited by Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
for federal courts, however, the relevant Due Process is the one found in Fifth Amendment.”).  
14 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
15 Id. at 313-14.  
16 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (emphasizing physical presence within the forum’s 
boundary), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 188 (1977).  
17 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1945). 
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exercising personal jurisdiction, they also require subject matter jurisdiction satisfying either (a) 
federal question jurisdiction18 or (b) diversity jurisdiction.19 
In the presence model, a corporate defendant must (1) be incorporated in the forum state; 
(2) have consented or waived to the forum state’s jurisdiction, (3) have assets or property in the 
forum state; or (4) have its principal place of business in the forum state.20 If a corporate defendant 
satisfies any of the prongs in the presence model, then the state courts, at least theoretically, can 
assert “general jurisdiction”21 over such defendants.22 General jurisdiction is defined as a court’s 
“power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or 
indirect, between the forum and the person whose legal rights are to be affected.”23 General 
jurisdiction asserted through the presence model is a direct approach against a corporate defendant 
for the cause of action arising anywhere in the world.  
 On the other hand, in the minimum contacts model (i) exercise of jurisdiction must be 
authorized by a state’s long-arm statute; (ii) the state’s long-arm statute must be consistent with 
the United States Constitution; and (iii) a corporate defendant must have purposeful contact with 
the forum state.24 If a state’s long-arm statute is unlimited, then the forum state can exercise 
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant to which it has connection or no connection 
at all.25 In short, “the exercise of jurisdiction must not offend traditional notion of fair play and 
substantial justice.”26  
In addition, if a non-resident-corporate defendant’s contact is purposeful, then under 
established models, specific or general jurisdiction can be asserted. The prevailing law states that 
specific jurisdiction is asserted when “affiliations between [a] forum and the underlying 
controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or 
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate.”27 
                                                 
18 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
19 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
20 Lecture Note: Professor Charles P. Cercone, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, Civil Procedure I (Spring 
2011) [hereinafter Professor Cercone].  
21 See infra text accompanying notes 21-30. 
22 See YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 56-58.  
23 See Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966); see also Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66, TEX. L. 
REV. 721, 727-28 (1988) (stating that professors Von Mehren & Trautman spelled the difference but did not specify 
which contacts might support general jurisdiction and which might establish specific jurisdiction).  
24Professor Cercone, supra note 20. 
25 Id.  
26 Int’l Shoe, 339 U.S. at 316.  
27 See Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1136.  
 
 




General jurisdiction asserted through the minimum contacts model is an indirect approach 
between a corporate defendant and the forum state.28 In the early era, the state’s long-arm statute 
and minimum contacts are designed to protect a state court’s arbitrary assertion of jurisdiction over 
out-of-state defendants. Today, in essence, the presence model protects only out-of-state corporate 
defendants’ interests unless corporate defendants are incorporated or have a principal place of 
business in the United States so as to satisfy “continuous and systematic operations, which is 
essentially regarded as home.”29 Although preferred justification for the minimum contacts model 
does not require actual presence, the Court’s empirical component rests on the phrase “essentially 
at home.”30  
This phrase suggests that general jurisdiction can be asserted through either the presence 
or the minimum contacts model, but specific jurisdiction can only be asserted through the minimum 
contacts model. In addition, the minimum contacts model adapted by the Court subverted an 
indirect approach of general jurisdiction in the state courts. Thus, the Court allegedly overlapped 
two different jurisdictional models in general jurisdiction cases.  
As a result, asserting general jurisdiction through either the presence or the minimum 
contacts model is very confusing and problematic to the courts and practitioners.31 Ironically, these 
models stem from two early era cases involving property law and a corporate agent’s activity in 
the forum State: Pennoyer v. Neff32 and International Shoe v. Washington.33  
Under the minimum contacts model, the Court has articulated that due process requires a 
non-resident corporation to establish meaningful contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state, 
which provide fair warning that a particular activity may subject the non-resident corporate 
defendant to the state’s jurisdiction.34 The Due Process Clause “gives a degree of predictability to 
the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”35  
                                                 
28 See supra text accompanying notes 11-26. 
29 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
30 See id.; Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1560-61 (Sotomayor J. concurring in part and dissenting in part and stating that 
“[w]hat was once a holistic, nuanced contacts analysis backed by considerations of fairness and reasonableness has 
now effectively been replaced by the rote identification of a corporation’s principal place of business or place of 
incorporation…. It is individual plaintiffs, harmed by the actions of a far-flung foreign corporation, who will bear the 
brunt of…[this] approach and be forced to sue in distant jurisdiction.”). 
31 See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877-78 (describing the lower courts’ analysis as confused); Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“the California Supreme Court's ‘sliding scale approach’ is difficult to square with our 
precedents. Under the California approach, the strength of the requisite connection between the forum and the specific 
claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to those claims. Our cases 
provide no support for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”) 
32 See discussion infra Part.I.A.1. 
33 See discussion infra Part.I.A.2. 
34 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
35 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1979). 
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Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, sister states must respect and enforce the judgment 
rendered by a forum state against foreign defendants unless the forum state does not have the 
power over an absent, out-of-state, or foreign defendant.36 States must provide equal access to their 
courts for claims based on federal law if state courts would otherwise have jurisdiction under local 
jurisdictional rules.37 In addition, under the Equal Protection Clause, corporations are persons.38 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the rights of life, 
liberty, and property “cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate 
procedures.”39 Therefore, a state court cannot compel a nonresident defendant to come to the forum 
state to defend a lawsuit.40 To that end, the Due Process Clause gives a defendant subjected to an 
unfair assertion of jurisdiction the right to attack that attempted assertion of jurisdiction. 41 The 
courts equally share important roles for domestic and international litigation for extended 
                                                 
36 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1(requiring that a State must give to the judgment of sister States the same effect 
that such judgments have in the State of retention); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (suggesting that the federal court must 
give full faith and credit to the State court’s judgment) 
37 See Lea Brilmayer and Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional 
Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and Conflict of Laws, 39 VA. L. REV 819, 826 (1983).  
38 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966) (stating that States of the Union are not persons 
for Due Process purposes), abrogated by Shelby Cty. of Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  
39 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
40 Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); NELSON P. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE 
35 (1st ed. 2011) [hereinafter PROFESSOR MILLER] (stating that “under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a State must 
recognize another State’s judgment unless the first court, which delivers the judgment over the defendant, has no 
personal jurisdiction.”).   
41 Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menfee, 237 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1915). The Riverside Court stated 
that  
[T]he enforcement of due process under the 14th Amendment was without influence upon the power 
to render the judgment, since that limitation was pertinent only to the determination of when and 
how the judgment, after it was rendered, could be enforced. But this doctrine, while admitting the 
operation of the due process clause, simply declines to make it effective. That is to say, it recognizes 
the right to invoke the protection of the clause, but denies its remedial efficiency by postponing its 
operation, and thus permitting that to be done which, if the constitutional guaranty were applied, 
would be absolutely prohibited. Nevertheless, the obvious answer to the proposition is that wherever 
a provision of the Constitution is applicable, the duty to enforce it is imperative and all embracing, 
and no act, which it forbids, may therefore be permitted. The enforcement of due process under the 
14th Amendment was without influence upon the power to render the judgment, since that limitation 
was pertinent only to the determination of when and how the judgment, after it was rendered, could 
be enforced. However, this doctrine, while admitting the operation of the due process clause, simply 
declines to make it effective. That is to say, it recognizes the right to invoke the protection of the 
clause, but denies its remedial efficiency by postponing its operation, and thus permitting that to be 
done which, if the constitutional guaranty were applied, would be absolutely prohibited. But the 
obvious answer to the proposition is that wherever a provision of the Constitution is applicable, the 









availability of damages for intangible harm, flexible discovery rules, punitive damages, and fair 
jury trial.42  
These established rules suggest that a corporation and an individual should be treated the 
same.43 As applied to orb-web corporations, however, this seems to be an incorrect analysis of our 
personal jurisdiction laws.44 Orb-web corporations are born in the United States, generally expand 
to other states, cross the nation’s boundaries, and acquire property while availing themselves of 
the benefit and protection of United States’ laws.45 Thus, an orb-web corporation cannot argue that 
defending a lawsuit in the United States is burdensome, or that it has been discriminated against.46  
Yet state courts have also increasingly relied on an incorrect application and analysis of 
these confusing precedents cases.47 In addition, general and specific jurisdiction under the 
minimum contacts model is a significant contributor to the unmeaningful outcome of cases in state 
courts.48 As a result, state courts have incorporated these two analyses in each case to determine 
personal jurisdiction, leading to confusion in jurisdictional law.49 To begin with, this article 
examines the Court’s pre-industrial era cases and their implications in present time.  
 
1. Pennoyer v. Neff 
 
In an early nineteenth century case, Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court used a direct assertion of 
jurisdiction and addressed an issue of sovereignty and introduced the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in personal jurisdiction analysis.50 The Court adopted a conservative 
theory and held that a state possessed exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and 
property within its territory and that no state should exercise “direct” jurisdiction and authority 
                                                 
42 PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 38, para. 3. 
43 See supra text and accompanying notes 34-40.  
44 See sources cited, supra notes 4-8. 
45 See infra diagram 1, p. 24.  
46 See also Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1949) (“After a State has chosen to 
domesticate foreign corporations, the adopted corporations are entitled to equal protection with the State’s own 
corporate progeny, at least to the extent that their property is entitled to an equally favorable ad valorem tax basis.”).  
47 See, e.g., Noll v. American Biltrite Inc., 395 P.3d 1021, 1026 (Wash. 2017) (“General jurisdiction requires 
extensive and systematic contacts with the forum state.” (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923-24)); Volkswagen 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Jones, 2017 WL 2180984, No. 2D15-5716, *6 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017) (stating that the plaintiff 
personally and unilaterally brought the car purchased from the defendant from New York to Florida and the “unilateral 
activity of another party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant 
has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.” (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408, 
417 (1984)).  
48 See sources cited in supra notes 4-8 
49 See id.  
50 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46. 
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over persons or property beyond its territory.51 The Court emphasized that every state owed 
protections to non-resident corporations having any property in the forum state.52  
Since Pennoyer, when a non-resident defendant’s property is within a state’s border, a state 
or federal court in that jurisdiction has the power to adjudicate any kind of controversy related to 
that property.53 The presence of assets or property provides a basis for adjudicating any claims 
against the defendant.54 Thus, Pennoyer emphasized the states’ volitional conduct, limited due 
process rights, and rigid standard to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants (and, of 
course, over the orb-web corporations). It is fair to say that the presence model mainly stemmed 
from Pennoyer.55 
 
2. International Shoe v. Washington 
 
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 56 on the other hand, the Court used an indirect 
assertion method and addressed the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
International Shoe, the defendant, a Delaware corporation, was amenable to proceedings in the 
Washington state court to recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation 
fund enacted under state statute.57  The Court held that the state court could assert personal 
jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation, which had its principal place of business in St. Louis, 
Missouri.58 Although the corporate defendant was not registered to do business in Washington, it 
maintained business in several states other than in Washington.59  
Additionally, the defendant did not have an office in Washington, did not have contracts 
for either sale or purchase of merchandise, and it did not stock any merchandise in the forum 
state.60 The defendant did not make any deliveries to the forum state in interstate commerce.61 The 
defendant only employed eleven of its employees under the corporation’s direct supervision and 
control, who resided in Washington and rented office or hotel space for exhibiting samples for that 
                                                 
51 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23 (stating that a State may obtain jurisdiction over defendants as long as they 
are subject to the State’s physical power. A State derives its physical power from its status as an independent sovereign, 
which possesses and imposes authority over persons or property within its borders.).  
52 YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 64; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).  
53 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.  
54 Id.  
55 Professor Cercone, supra note 20.  
56 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.  
57 Id. at 311.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 313.  
60 Id. at 313.  
61 Id.  
 
 




purpose.62 The State argued that the corporation must pay tax to the state unemployment fund, as 
it was doing business in the State of Washington, but International Shoe argued that if the 
corporation had to pay taxes to Washington then it had to pay taxes to every states in which it did 
business.63  
In sum, the Court created a new theory that a defendant must have “certain minimum 
contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”64 The Court added that a non-resident corporate 
defendant’s contact with a forum state must be reasonable, in the context of our federal system of 
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit; and an “estimate of the 
inconveniences” to a corporation having to litigate away from its “home” or principal place of 
business is a relevant consideration.65  
 Corporations are fictions; therefore, corporate activities must be carried through its 
agents.66 Accordingly, either corporate agents’ presence or activities within the forum state satisfy 
due process.67 States may thus make binding in personam judgments against individuals or 
corporate defendants if states have some contacts, ties, or relations.68  
 
3. Takeaway from These Historical Cases 
 
International Shoe’s main revolution was giving states the ability to reach out-of-state 
defendants through their long-arm statutes.69 In addition, the Court recognized the presence of a 
corporation by the presence of its agents.70 On the other hand, the Pennoyer rationale is simple: A 
state has the power over persons and things within its borders, but a state cannot sue an out-of-
state defendant beyond its borders.71 Pennoyer only focused on physical presence of persons or 
properties within state borders. Whereas International Shoe sought to expand the jurisdiction of a 
state court with liberal interpretation of the Due Process Clause and advocated a mere flexible 
standard of fairness by setting an example of a corporation’s behaviors and relationship with its 
                                                 
62 Id. at 314.  
63 Id. at 318.  
64 Id. at 316.  
65 Id.  
66 See id. at 316-17. 
67 Id. at 317 (stating, however, that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even the agent’s single or 
isolated activities in a State on the corporation’s behalf were not enough to subject the corporation to suit on causes 
of action unrelated with activities in the forum State).  
68 Id. at 319.  
69 See discussion supra Part I.A.2 
70 See supra text accompanying notes 56-67. 
71 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23.  
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domestic units.72  
In International Shoe, the Court initiated five possible theories that fall within the presence 
model: (a) consent, (b) agency, (c) doing business, (d) state of incorporation, and (e) principal 
place of business.73 In addition, it also activated a minimum contacts model. Although the presence 
and minimum contacts models stemmed from these two cases, neither Pennoyer nor International 
Shoe provided any appropriate guidance for orb-web corporations because in Pennoyer and 
International Shoe, the defendant was an individual or a single corporation with limited business 
activities.  
Although both Pennoyer and International Shoe provided remarkable tools for a corporate 
defendant, the Court impermissibly blended the presence and minimum contacts models to 
determine general jurisdiction in subsequent cases. Pennoyer was decided in the pre-industrial era 
without modern transportation or communications, and International Shoe was decided with a 
more modern approach.74 
 
4. Inconsistent Approaches of Due Process 
 
The Due Process Clause focuses on the relation among defendant, forum, and litigation in 
tort cases.75 The case law certainly suggests that a non-resident corporate defendant can be sued 
far from and without the minimum contacts with the forum state.76 Even though states have strong 
interests in exercising their tort laws, recent cases such as Goodyear, McIntyre, Bauman, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, and Tyrrell have interpreted jurisdiction in such a way that precludes the states from 
providing effective means of redressing those harms corporate defendants have caused to their 
citizens.77 The Court has interpreted due process to be applied to each defendant’s action 
individually so that each defendant’s contacts with the forum must be purposeful if a state is to 
reach that defendant.78 In recent cases, the Court failed to acknowledge that the Court’s precedent 
                                                 
72 See infra text accompanying notes 63-64. In International Shoe, the corporation had only one unit that was 
at issue; however, this theory did not provide any solution for orb-web corporations. 
73 See supra text accompanying notes 56-67. Cf. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (majority 
opinion) (describing that the corporation does business in California by stating that “BMS does sell Plavix in 
California. Between 2006 and 2012, it sold almost 187 million Plavix pills in the State and took in more than $900 
million from those sales.”). 
74 See YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 71.  
75 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 
1781 (majority opinion) (describing that plaintiffs must be the forum state residents and must claim to have suffered 
harm in that forum. In short, some sort of causation is required). 
76 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.   
77 See supra Part I.A; see also discussion infra Parts II-IV. 
78 Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984) (describing “jurisdiction over a parent 
corporation automatically establishes jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary.”).  
 
 




cases involved a single corporate defendant, but have not involved an orb-web or a multinational 
corporation.79 Thus, the current theory of fairness is vague at the best. 
In addition, the U.S. Constitution gives each state the power to tax and open its courts to 
its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business within its borders.80 A tort claim generally 
occurs wherever an offending product or material is distributed or circulated.81 Generally, due 
process does not intend to oust traditional tort law or liability for injuries, but it should be 
interpreted along with the federal rules, which are analogous to those traditionally imposed by 
state tort law.82 
 
5. Interpretations of the Constitutional Requirements of the Due Process Clause  
 by Different Authorities 
 
Generally, “[s]tate courts are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights”83 because 
state courts’ jurisdiction is determined by state legislatures and not by Congress.84 In addition, 
Congress cannot lawfully force, either indirectly or directly, the Supreme Court to reverse a state 
court’s decision as long as the state court’s jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution.85 
Traditionally, states may constitutionally exercise power over individuals, partnerships, 
and unincorporated associations, which transact business or do certain acts within the states’ 
borders.86 Likewise, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to recognize another state’s 
judgment where the judgment is consistent with the Due Process Clause.87 Thus, a judgment 
delivered by a state court is enforceable in other states and enforceable in the United States. 
                                                 
79 See supra Part I.C. 
80 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 324-25 (Black, J., dissenting) 
81 PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 81; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 577A (1977). 
82 See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).  
83 H.M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 
66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953) (“The State courts, in the scheme of the Constitution, are the primary guarantors 
of constitutional rights, and in many cases, they may be the ultimate ones. If they were to fail, and if Congress had 
taken away the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and been upheld in doing so, then we really would be sunk.” 
(international citation omitted)). 
84 See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (stating that the federal government cannot interfere in 
State courts’ decisions except in three cases by exclusive authority over the subject, by simple grant of authority, or 
by a subsequent prohibition to the States).  
85 See id. at 138.  
86 See Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627 (1935) (stating that “A nonresident who gets all the 
benefit of the protection of the laws of this State with regard to the office or agency and the business so transacted 
ought to be amenable to the laws of the State as to transactions growing out of such business upon the same basis and 
conditions as govern residents of this State. ‘It makes no hostile discrimination against nonresidents, but tends to put 
them on the same footing as residents.’”). 
87 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (describing that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not apply to French corporations).  
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Nevertheless, the Court never interpreted these established provisions, but instead created new 
models and left many questions unanswered.  
Additionally, under the Commerce Clause,88 states cannot limit corporations from carrying 
out business in interstate commerce and cannot attach conditions so as to unduly burden interstate 
commerce, but reasonable taxation and reasonable regulations are permissible.89 However, some 
have interpreted the Fifth Amendment as allowing the foreign defendant’s contact with the United 
States as a whole rather than a particular forum.90  
An emerging view is that an existence of national contacts presumptively, but not 
conclusively establishes jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment.91 However, federal courts 
provide a nationwide forum for a defendant through forum non-conveniens,92 but state courts 
provide a nationwide forum through the Full Faith and Credit Clause.93 Additionally, some federal 
statutes also allow both nationwide and worldwide service of process, thereby providing federal 
and state courts the same territorial reach without regard to states’ boundaries.94 Thus, the 
minimum contacts model has absolutely no practical and theoretical purpose for determining 
jurisdiction.  
Even though we assume that the minimum contacts model is valid, it should be a 
defendant’s burden to show that the chosen forum is sufficiently inconvenient and will be 
materially disadvantageous in the trial of the case.95 However, the challenge presented is the 
distinction between the general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction under the minimum contacts 
model. Professors Von Mehren and Trautman argued that  
 
Jurisdictional rules customarily favored the defendant because, “at least when the 
parties enjoy[ed] relatively equal economic strength and social standing,” the 
burden was on the plaintiff to change the “status quo” between the parties. Indeed, 
the traditional rule was that “actor forum rei sequitur (the plaintiff must pursue the 
defendant in his forum).” Accordingly, traditional bases of jurisdiction--“in 
personam,” “quasi in rem,” and “in rem”--predicated adjudicatory authority on the 
sovereign’s physical power over the defendant or their property, expecting the 
                                                 
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”).  
89 Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oreson, 511 U.S. 91, 108 (1994) (citation omitted); see 
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877). 
90 PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 119.  
91 Id.  
92 See 28 U.S.C. § 1397.  
93 See infra text accompanying notes 153-164.  
94 PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 118 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 22, which authorizes service on Clayton Act 
defendant “wherever [defendant] may be found”; 15 U.S.C.A § 78aa (Section 27 of the 1934 Securities Act)).  
95 PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 119.  
 
 




plaintiff to come to sue where one or the other could be found.96 
 
The recent cases made it clear that there is no “relatively equal economic strength and 
social standing”97 between individuals and orb-web corporations.98 Arguably, due process remains 
a complex theory because neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment clarified 
how due process can be satisfied for either out-of-state corporations or orb-web corporations, but 
the courts have evaluated case law with inconsistent dimensions and suggested several theories to 
assert jurisdiction.99 Therefore, a re-routed approach of jurisdictional law is of prime importance. 
 
B. Consequences of a Plaintiff’s Forum Selection 
 
Before examining an orb-web corporation more closely, it is important to know how 
selection of a forum may influence or widen the jurisdictional gap. Assume that a selected forum 
is a plaintiff’s domicile or the United States; the question is whether orb-web defendant 
corporation would be burdened to litigate in the selected forum.  
As Justice Holmes has described it, “domicil[e] is the technically pre-eminent headquarters 
that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that have been attached 
to it by the law may be determined.”100 Professor Lea Brilmayer has stated that “domicile of the 
parties to a suit would provide a forum convenient to them. Defendants, especially, would seem to 
benefit from a rule basing jurisdiction upon domicile.”101 Although the theory of domicile does 
not necessarily mean it would be convenient to the plaintiff alone, it certainly provides one sure 
forum to sue a defendant. 102  
Typically, plaintiffs have the option to file a suit in any forum related to that suit when the 
plaintiff files with a court of the state where he or she is domiciled. However, a plaintiff’s choice 
of forum requires substantial consideration of due process particularly when a foreign corporation 
is involved. Perhaps “a plaintiff has [a] conceivable opportunity to shop around for a forum 
                                                 
96 Harvard Law Association, Personal Jurisdiction – General Jurisdiction – Daimler AG v. Bauman, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 311, 316-17 (2014) (internal citation omitted) (stating that in general jurisdiction cases, the plaintiff 
needs to come to the defendant’s place to sue while in specific jurisdiction cases, the defendant may come to him).  
97 See cases cited supra notes 4-6. 
98 Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The majority chides 
respondents for conjuring a ‘parade of horribles,’ but says nothing about how suits like those described here will 
survive its opinion in this case. The answer is simple: They will not.” (citation omitted)). 
99 See, e.g., Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 (describing defendants must be “essentially at home”); McIntyre, 564 
U.S. 873 (describing that defendants contact must be purposeful); Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (same as Goodyear); 
BNSF R. Co., 137 S. Ct. 1549 (describing that the defendant’s substantial and continuous contact is not enough).  
100 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914); see Christopher T. Corson, Reform of Domicile Law 
for Application to Transients, Temporary Residents and Multi-Based Persons, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327 
(1981).  
101 Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 730.  
102 Id. at 730-31.  
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because of geographical convenience and advantage of choice of law.”103 It is also likely that a 
plaintiff’s chosen forum may not be convenient for the defendant.  
If an alternative forum is in a foreign country, involving a foreign corporation, a plaintiff’s 
jurisdictional determination becomes even more complex. With respect to a foreign forum, it is 
likely inconvenient to an individual plaintiff, but the same may not be true to a foreign-corporate 
defendant. For example, in Goodyear, two boys from North Carolina died due to injuries sustained 
in a tragic bus accident in France.104 The case could have been litigated in France.105 However, the 
decedents were from North Carolina, so their parents returned to North Carolina for the burial and 
filed a case in a North Carolina State court against Goodyear USA and its subsidiaries.106  
The trial court had to determine whether it would be reasonable to exercise jurisdiction 
over the Goodyear defendants in state courts or federal district courts located in North Carolina. 
The trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s forum selection would be appropriate although it is 
inconvenient to the foreign subsidiaries.107 Perhaps an answer lies in Restatement of Conflict of 
Law § 29 that “[a] State has a power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is 
domiciled in the State.”108 However, the Supreme Court said that the state court could not assert 
jurisdiction over the foreign defendants when they were not “essentially at home.”109 Thus, the 
Court’s language itself created a controversy.  
On the other hand, the Goodyear plaintiffs might never have pursued their claims abroad, 
particularly because the case was emotionally-charged and the plaintiffs claimed substantial 
                                                 
103 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981).  
104 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. 
105 See id.  
106 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 
4628575, at *120-127 (Joint Appendix). At the time of the accident, the driver of the bus was acting as an agent of 
Eric Meter, the French Soccer Network, the European Soccer Network, and NCYSA. The driver was a city bus driver, 
and he generally did not drive buses to the airport, was not familiar with the highways, and had never driven a bus 
along the route on which these events took place. When the bus reached the ramp on the intersection of highway, the 
driver engaged in a loud and animated conversation with the travel agent and became distracted. On entering upon the 
curve, the bus lost the control. The bus skidded sideways and hit a low, concrete separating wall then it over turned 
onto its left side while returning onto the roadway and slid until it came to rest by the side off the roadway in a field. 
The ramp on which the accident occurred was known to be a high accident area. Warning signs were posted in advance 
of the curve. The posted speed limit was 70 km per hour, but the evidence presented showed that the driver was driving 
100 km per hour. Additionally, heavy rain fell shortly before, and it was falling at the time the bus approached the 
curve, substantially reducing the tires’ grip with the road. One of the children was sitting in the rear of the bus while 
the other was sitting in a front seat of the bus. The bus’s tires were defective and failed while the bus was travelling 
around the curve. The defective tires were manufactured by defendant Goodyear and its subsidiaries.  
107 See Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50, 55 (2009), aff’d, 364 N.C. 128 (2010), rev’d sub nom., Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
108 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 29 (1971); PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 28, 
53; DICEY & MORIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 284-87 (13th ed. 2000).  
109 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 
 
 




damages.110 The presumption of a chosen forum is “even stronger” when the plaintiff is an 
American citizen and an alternative forum is a foreign country such as France.111 Also, the Tenth 
Amendment provides the “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.”112 
The question, then, is whether private and public interest factors render a plaintiff’s choice 
of forum appropriate. In fact, “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's 
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”113 In contrast, an important interest of the United 
States in providing a forum in consideration of a foreign defendant was articulated in Iragorri v. 
United Technologies Corp.,114 which reasoned that  
 
It is not a correct understanding of the rule to accord deference only when the suit 
is brought in the plaintiff’s home district. But the court must consider a plaintiff’s 
likely motivations in the light of all relevant indications...motivated by legitimate 
reasons, including the plaintiff’s convenience and the ability of the U.S. resident 
plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign defendant, and diminishing 
deference to a plaintiff’s forum choice to the extent that it was motivated by tactical 
advantage.115  
 
Similarly, if a non-citizen plaintiff files a case in the United States and if an alternative 
forum is a better forum than the plaintiff’s selected forum, then a court gives stronger preference 
to that alternative forum.116 For example, in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at 
Bhopal, the plaintiffs were non-U.S. citizens, and the defendant corporation, Union Carbide India 
Limited (“UCIL”), was incorporated under Indian law but was a subsidiary of U.S. parent-
corporation Union Carbide Corp., a New York corporation.117  
In this case, the tragic industrial disaster occurred in Bhopal, India, where a highly toxic 
gas leaked from the plant in substantial quantities, killed more than 2100 people, injured over 
200,000 people, killed livestock, damaged crops, and interrupted the city’s businesses.118 Since 
the parent corporation was born in the United States, the Indian Government filed cases involving 
approximately 200,000 plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
                                                 
110 See, e.g., D.W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non-Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353 
(1994)  
111 Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 378 (2d Cir. 1972). 
112 U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
113 Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  
114 Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001). 
115 Id. at 73.  
116 In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
117 Id. 
118 Id.  
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New York.119 The District Court held that India provided an adequate alternative forum for the 
litigation by stating that when a plaintiff is foreign, the plaintiff’s choice of forum deserves less 
deference.120  
Under established models, the Court recently said that the most fertile place to sue an orb-
web corporation has been a neutral forum such as corporation’s world headquarters or principal 
place of business.121 If so, not only is the interest of judicial economy protected but also the 
plaintiff’s case is much safer from being thrown out due to lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction whereas state courts are courts of 
general jurisdiction.122 The problem is that many U.S. plaintiffs do not have economic strength to 
go to a different state, where the orb-web corporation’s headquarters is located, to sue a corporation 
for its wrongdoing.  
Under the minimum contacts model, states’ long-arm statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure have established a ground to sue such defendants in state courts.123 As Justice Scalia 
once emphasized, “a plaintiff should simultaneously consider the ‘subject matter’ of the case, when 
selecting a forum, because administrative simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional statute...[a] 
sort of vague boundary that is to be avoided in the area of subject-matter jurisdiction wherever 
possible.’”124 It is true that a federal forum may not be an appropriate forum for an individual 
plaintiff when suing an orb-web-corporation.  
For example, in Goodyear, the plaintiff filed a complaint and sent service of process under 
a Hague Convention, a federal treaty, to three Goodyear subsidiaries, asserting a North Carolina 
state court as a forum.125 In Goodyear, the first problem arose when the alternative jurisdiction 
was a foreign nation even though the plaintiffs asserted a state-law cause of action--a wrongful 
death.126 Second, Goodyear and its subsidiaries’ origination, direction, control, and co-ordination 
were from the corporation’s world headquarters, located in Akron, Ohio.127 Goodyear’s 
subsidiaries could have had a fair opportunity to be sued in Akron, which also meant that the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum would not have been very fruitful.128 Third, plaintiffs have included 
Goodyear’s North Carolina subsidiary, a plant incorporated in North Carolina, which has a 
                                                 
119 Id. 
120 Id.  
121 See infra note 128 and accompanying text 
122 See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 25-26 (1820) (recognizing a state court’s jurisdiction).  
123 Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 375 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
124 See id.  
125 See Joint Appendix, supra note 106, at 3-119.  
126 See id.  
127 See id.  
128 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 130 (2010) (“[T]he phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to 
the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.”).  
 
 




principal place of business in New York.129 In the light of these facts, the question arises whether 
the plaintiff could have intended Goodyear North Carolina as an agent of Goodyear USA. The 
plaintiffs could not sue in federal court, and the Court said that the plaintiff could not sue in the 
state court, which ultimately resulted in a wrong forum.  
Under the established law, state courts are very inconsistent in analyzing personal 
jurisdiction.130 Some courts consider factors, such as whether a plaintiff’s forum choice is 
motivated by (a) the convenience of the plaintiff's residence in relation to the chosen forum, (b) 
the availability of witnesses or evidence to the forum district, (c) the defendant’s amenability to 
suit in the forum district, (d) the availability of appropriate legal assistance, and (e) other reasons 
relating to convenience or expense.131 Other courts consider whether a plaintiff’s forum selection 
causes any harassment to the defendant, such as a tactical advantage resulting from local laws 
favoring the plaintiff's case, juries’ habitual generosity in the forum district, the plaintiff’s 
popularity or the defendant’s unpopularity in the region, or the defendant’s inconvenience and 
expenses resulting from litigation in that forum.132  
In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,133 the Court emphasized that a plaintiff may select 
a forum, in tort litigation where the harm takes place, even though it may be unreasonably 
burdensome to a non-resident defendant.134 In this case, the plaintiffs, the Robinsons, were 
domiciled in New York.135 Defendants Seaway and Worldwide were also citizens of New York.136 
The plaintiffs purchased from the defendants an Audi which exploded and severely injured the 
plaintiff’s wife and their child while they were moving to their new domicile, Arizona.137 The 
plaintiffs filed a case where the accident had occurred, a blue collar area outside Tulsa, 
Oklahoma.138 Even though the burden on the defendants had been always a primary concern, the 
Court considered other factors, including 
 
The forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in 
obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest was not 
adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum; the interstate 
                                                 
129 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.  
130 See supra note 46 and accompanying text 
131 Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus. Inc. 416 F.3d 146, 153 (2nd Cir. 2005) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 443, 507 (1947), cert denied sub nom., Tyumen Oil Comp. v. Norex Petroleum Ltd., 547 U.S. 1175 
(2006)). 
132 See, e.g., Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72.  
133 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286. 
134 Id. at 292. 
135 Id.  
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judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, 
and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies (internal citation omitted).139 
 
Often, a plaintiff’s careful selection of a forum results in winning or losing a case if the 
selected forum satisfies the Due Process Clause. Like the plaintiffs’ forum selection in World-
Wide Volkswagen, in Daimler AG v. Bauman,140 the plaintiff’s forum selection was appropriate, 
but the plaintiff was not given an opportunity in the United States, even though the plaintiffs 
satisfied many of the “other factors” offered in World-Wide Volkswagen.141  
In Bauman, Argentinian employees’ estates (“plaintiffs”) filed a suit in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that MB Argentina collaborated with 
Argentinian State security forces and kidnapped, detained, tortured, and killed its employees and 
their relatives under the military dictatorship during Argentina’s “dirty war.”142 Plaintiffs sued in 
the United States under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Torture Victim Protection 
Act of 1991, and under the laws of California and Argentina.143 They claimed that Daimler 
Mercedes Benz’s subsidiary, Mercedes Benz Argentina (“MBA”), unlawfully violated civil rights 
in collaboration with Argentinian authorities.144  
Under these facts, it is unreasonable to expect these plaintiffs would have received a fair 
hearing or an opportunity to be heard in their country. MBA was a subsidiary wholly owned by 
Daimler’s predecessor in interest.145 Plaintiffs filed a case in federal court in California because 
Daimler had a subsidiary in California, MBUSA, which served as Daimler’s exclusive importer 
and distributor in the United States.146 MBUSA purchases Mercedes-Benz automobiles from 
                                                 
139 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; See Tapio Puurunen, The Judicial Jurisdiction of States 
Over International Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce from the Perspective of Legal Certainty, U.C. DAVIS 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 133, 199 (2002) (describing protecting consumer and State interests under the minimum contacts 
and reasonableness test).  
140 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
141 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. Stating that other factors include the 
[b]urden on defendant, [which] while always primary concern in determining jurisdiction of a 
nonresident defendant, will in appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, 
including interest of forum state in adjudicating disputes, plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief, at least when such interest is not adequately protected by plaintiff's power to 
choose the forum, interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining most efficient resolution of 
controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental, substantive 
social policies. (internal citation omitted). 
142 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 751-52. 
143 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the United States.”). 
144 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
145 Id.  
146 See id. at 751 
 
 




Daimler in Germany, then imports these vehicles, and ultimately distributes them to independent 
dealerships located throughout the U.S.147Although MBUSA’s principal place of business is in 
New Jersey and incorporated in Delaware, it has multiple California-based facilities, including a 
regional office in Costa Mesa, a vehicle preparation center in Carson, and a classic center in 
Irvine.148 MBUSA is the largest supplier of luxury vehicles in the California market, including 
over 10% of all sales of new vehicles, which accounts for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales.149 
Under these facts, it is hard to accept that the plaintiffs’ forum selection was not correct. 
Additionally, the Court also noted that at the time of the lawsuit, Daimler-Chrysler North 
America was holding a corporation, which wholly owned MBUSA.150 After a lawsuit was filed, 
MBUSA signed an agreement with Daimler AG under which MBUSA was recognized as an 
“independent contractor” of Daimler, and that MBUSA was not a general or special agent, or 
partner, or joint venture, or an employee of Daimler.151  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could not assert jurisdiction in 
California.152 The Court relied on the contractual terms and did not recognize the constitutional 
provisions that granted jurisdiction to federal district courts.153 Although the federal statue granted 
jurisdiction based on claims “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States,”154 Daimler was a German company, and the agreement 
between Daimler and MBUSA prevented the Court from asserting jurisdiction.155  
As noted, the parties entered contract after the case was filed even though it is generally 
not accepted practice under the law. It is well established that the doors of Justice are open to 
everyone regardless of race, religion, or nationality. If so, why was the plaintiffs’ forum selection 
in Bauman incorrect? 
In deciding cases like Daimler and many other orb-web corporations, the Court presented 
no resolution to the disputes against those injured individuals. In short, the plaintiffs in Bauman 
ended-up, once again, in a wrong forum.  
                                                 
147 Id.  
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id.  
151 See id.   
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 See id.  
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Perhaps the strongest string in this analysis are the recent cases such as Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co.,156 and Tyrrell.157A typical case of forum selection by the plaintiff is Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co.158 There, a group of plaintiffs filed a case in California state court against the corporate 
defendant Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”), a pharmaceutical company.159 The Court noted that 
only 86 plaintiffs were California residents and another 592 plaintiffs were not California 
residents.160 These plaintiffs filed a case asserting various state law based claims for health 
injuries caused by the defendant’s pharmaceutical drug.161 Although BMS was incorporated in 
Delaware and had a principal place of business in New York, it maintained substantial operations 
in New York, New Jersey, and California.162 In California, BMS has five research and laboratory 
facilities and employs around 164 employees and 250 sales representatives.163 The Court 
nevertheless advised that out-of-state plaintiffs may join with in-state plaintiffs “in a consolidated 
action in the states that have general jurisdiction over” the corporate defendant.164 However, the 
Court also said that “the plaintiffs who are residents of a particular State—for example, the 92 
plaintiffs from Texas and the 71 from Ohio—could probably sue together in their home States.”165 
What the Court perceives from BMS is that although plaintiffs are free to make their forum 
selection in theory, in practice, plaintiffs’ forum selection is limited because to win over forum 
selection--the corporate defendant must be “essentially at home.”166  
                                                 
156 Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1549; see also BMS.COM, https://www.bms.com/ about-
us/our-company/worldwide-facilities.html (last visited August 2017). 
157 See id. (“We are a global biopharmaceutical company focused on helping to address the unmet medical 
needs of patients with serious diseases. In 2016, we invested $4.9 billion in R&D, which included the discovery and 
development of new medicines”).  
158 Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1773. 
159 Id. at 1778, 1779. 
160 Id. at 1777.  
161 Id. at 1783. 
162 Id. at 1777-78. 
163 Id. at 1773, 1778; Plavix Prod. & Mktg. Cases, No. JCCP4748, 2013 WL 6150251, at *2 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 23, 2013). One of BMS’s offices, in Milpitas California, is owned by BMS, and the remainder are leased. 
The Milpitas facility is used primarily for research and employs 85 people. Three other offices are primarily used as 
research and laboratory facilities. 
164 Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1777-78.  
165 Id. at 1783. 
166 See id. at 1781.  
The State Supreme Court found that specific jurisdiction was present without identifying any 
adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’ claims. As noted, the nonresidents were not 
prescribed Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in California, did not 
ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix in California. The mere fact 
that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly 
 
 




Likewise, in Tyrrell, the BNSF, a railroad defendant, had over 2,000 miles of railroad 
track and employed more than 2,000 workers in the forum state.167 In that case, the Court, relying 
on precedent cases, said that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not permit a 
state to hale an out-of-state corporation before its courts when the corporation is not “at home” in 
the state and the episode-in-suit occurred elsewhere.168 In Tyrrell, plaintiff Robert Nelson, a North 
Dakota resident, brought a Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) suit against BNSF in a 
Montana state court to recover damages for knee injuries he allegedly sustained while working 
for BNSF as a fuel-truck driver.169Another plaintiff, Kelli Tyrrell, appointed in South Dakota as 
the administrator of her husband Brent Tyrrell’s estate, similarly sued BNSF under FELA in the 
same forum state court.170 Plaintiff Tyrrell’s widow alleged that the deceased plaintiff developed 
a fatal kidney cancer from his exposure to carcinogenic chemicals while working for BNSF.171 
The Court focused on the fact that neither plaintiff alleged injuries arising from or related to work 
                                                 
sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific 
jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims. 
 
167 See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017); see also BNSF, UNITED STATES SECURITY 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT 1-51, http://www.bnsf.com/about-bnsf/financial-information/pdf/10k-llc-2016.pdf.  
Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC (BNSF or the Company) is a holding company that conducts 
no operating activities and owns no significant assets other than through its interests in its 
subsidiaries. BNSF’s principal, wholly-owned subsidiary is BNSF Railway Company (BNSF 
Railway), which operates one of the largest railroad networks in North America.  BNSF Railway 
operates approximately 32,500 route miles of track (excluding multiple main tracks, yard tracks and 
sidings) in 28 states and also operates in three Canadian provinces. Through one operating 
transportation services segment, BNSF Railway transports a wide range of products and 
commodities including the transportation of Consumer Products, Industrial Products, Agricultural 
Products, and Coal, derived from manufacturing, agricultural and natural resource industries, which 
constituted 35 percent, 25 percent, 22 percent, and 18 percent, respectively, of total freight revenues 
for the year ended December 31, 2016. These Consolidated Financial Statements include BNSF, 
BNSF Railway and other majority-owned subsidiaries, all of which are separate legal entities. Id. at 
1.  
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation was incorporated in the State of Delaware on December 
16, 1994. On February 12, 2010, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a Delaware corporation (Berkshire), 
acquired 100% of the outstanding shares of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation common 
stock that it did not already own. The acquisition was completed through the merger (Merger) of a 
Berkshire wholly-owned merger subsidiary and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation with the 
surviving entity renamed Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC. Berkshire’s cost of acquiring BNSF 
was pushed-down to establish a new accounting basis for BNSF beginning as of February 13, 2010. 
Earnings per share data is not presented because BNSF has only one holder of its membership 
interests. Id.  
168 BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1553. 
169 Id. at 1554 (citation omitted). 
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performed in the forum state and deceased plaintiff Tyrrell never worked for BNSF in the forum 
state.172 Thus, it is clear that not only plaintiffs must be forum state residents, but also defendants 
must be forum residents as well.  
It is clear that the light shed on “forum selection” by the plaintiff in these cases can be 
seen only if each case is examined based on its own facts. The Court’s “heightened standard” to 
sue continued in these series of cases. This is to say that it is almost impossible for U.S. plaintiffs 
to sue even in their own states or foreign states unless both plaintiffs and defendants are 
“essentially at home.” 
 
C. Introduction of Orb-Web-Corporations 
 
With undertaking an exhaustive review of plaintiffs’ forum selection and its consequences 
as traced from the recent cases, it seems proper to say that the legal contents and structure of orb-
web corporations and its application thereof in a factual framework in jurisdictional analysis is 
anything but clear in the future cases. The development of “no forum” for a U.S. plaintiff prompts 
observation of crucial differences among small corporations, multinational corporations, and orb-
web corporations.  
Small corporations are those discussed in International Shoe. Multinational corporations 
have been described by one scholar:  “[i]f one borrows from the business literature a working 
definition of a multinational enterprise [“MNE”] as ‘a cluster of corporations of diverse 
nationalit[ies] joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common 
management strategy,’ one sees that the present legal framework has no comfortable, tidy 
receptacle for such an institution.”173 This scholar said, “[t]he law recognizes as ‘international 
corporations’ only those entities which are constructed by international law, that is, by treaty.”174 
Thus far, the only representatives of the category are a small number of intergovernmental joint 
ventures, largely between nations of the European Economic Community (“EEC”).175 
Additionally, multinational corporations may not be in the form of a parent-subsidiary relationship.  
Orb-web corporations, on the other hand, are much larger corporations than multinational 
corporations. These corporations expand and organize their businesses by establishing subsidiary 
corporations in the form of a spider web.176 Generally, an orb-web corporation is born from a 
parent (or an “orb”) corporation, and it expands vertically and horizontally into subsidiaries 
(forming a “web”).177 Each subsidiary then vertically incorporates in another state (and country or 
                                                 
172 See id. at 1558. 
173 Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 739, 740 (1970).  
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 See infra diagram 1.  
177 See Andersson, Ulf, Subsidiary Network Embeddedness: Integration, Control and Influence in the 
Multinational Corporation (Jan. 24, 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis) (on file at 
http://uu.diva.portal.org/smash/record) (stating that under the legal system, subsidiaries may under corporate 
 
 




continent), expands its business in different countries, and may further affiliate with other 
corporations and spread over an entire continent. However, only subsidiary corporations of the 
parent are part of web. Even though other affiliates merely support (or do business with) the 
subsidiaries for their spare parts and necessary by-products, with the subsidiaries, they are 
independent companies and carry their own identity. The relationship between these subsidiaries 
and the affiliates are often contractual, and they are not in the web, even though these affiliates 
rely on the web (or subsidiaries).  
Moreover, some of the subsidiaries horizontally incorporate and connect with other 
subsidiaries of the orb corporation. This article calls these horizontal subsidiaries headquarters, 
which are incorporated in such a way that they tie the entire web with the parent (or orb) 
corporation. Also, these horizontal headquarters are directly connected with the parent corporation 
to expand the parent corporation’s business and mission. Often, the board of directors and higher 
officials of an orb-web corporation are the same for the orb and the headquarters even though these 
headquarters are in different countries or continents.178 
These vertical subsidiary corporations disseminate in such a way to (i) address local 
markets; (ii) minimize liability and protect assets; (iii) reduce cost of production by utilizing local 
labor force, expertise, and resources; (iv) reduce transportation expenses; (v) match local market 
demands and shape the production accordingly; (vi) conduct and maintain administrative work 
effectively; (vii) create a monopoly by spreading the parent’s trademark and its product; (viii) sell 
over productions for higher profits; (ix) maximize overall net profits of the parent corporation; and 
(x) avoid paying taxes.179 Thus, the strong interconnections between subsidiaries, headquarters, 
and the orb form a giant web. The entire web plays an important role in carrying a mission of the 
orb. In the web, each subsidiary makes its own contribution to the orb. In recent decisions,180 the 
Court overlooked that each subsidiary corporation of the orb was not a separate and distinct entity 
but an integral part of the whole orb-web corporation.181 
                                                 
embeddedness maintain relationship with sister subsidiaries, which affects the multinational corporation’s behavior 
in general).  
178 See infra diagram 1.  
179 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in 
Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975); Shyam Soni, Essay on the Meaning and Definition of Multinational 
Corporation, PRESERVEARTICLES.COM, http://www.preservearticles.com/2012010319696/ essay-on-the-meaning-
and-definitio-of-multinational-company.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2017); Parent Companies and Their Subsidiaries 
in the European Union, EUROPEAN COMMISSION TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/parents-subsidiary_directive/index_en.htm (showing the 
general behavior of the parent and subsidiary relationship); Tim Dickinson, The Biggest Tax Scam Ever, ROLLING 
STONE (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-biggest-tax-scam-ever-20140827 (stating 
that “Some of the America’s top corporations are parking profits overseas and ducking hundreds of billions in taxes. 
And how’s Congress responding? It’s rewarding them for ripping us off”).  
180 See cases cited supra notes 4-6. 
181 Kevin B. Barefoot, U.S. Multinational Companies: Operations of U.S. Parents and Their Foreign 
Affiliates in 2010, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2012/11%20November/ 1112MNCs.pdf (stating that a U.S. MNC comprises a U.S. 
parent company and its foreign affiliates, presented by the “Annual Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 
conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)”). 
 
 





D.  Problems with the Established Models in an Orb-Web Corporation’s Setting 
 
As the diagram above indicates, orb-web corporations are structurally different from the 
structure of the corporation involved in International Shoe. Hence, an application of the 
established models in jurisdictional analysis of an orb-web corporation presents a grave legitimacy 
and constitutionality problem.182 Obviously, this unequal bargaining power between individuals 
and orb-web corporations often favors and benefits corporations only.183 Despite courts’ noble 
intention to provide the maximum deference to out-of-state defendants, current jurisdictional 
models are one-sided and biased. To overcome grave unconstitutionality and injustice, this Article 
proposes three rerouted approaches that are consistent with the Court’s objectives.  
This article proposes that the Constitution, through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, allows 
a judgment rendered in a state court to be enforced in sister state courts and thus permits nationwide 
jurisdiction.184 In drafting the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the framers of the Constitution were 
motivated by a desire to unify the U.S. as one nation while preserving the autonomy and 
independency of a dual system of government.185 To that end, they sought to guarantee that 
                                                 
182 See supra Part.I.A.1-2. 
183 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.  
184 See Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 732 (“The power rationale, therefore, results in unavoidable circularity: 
a State has power and thus jurisdiction over an absent defendant domiciliary only if sister States will enforce the 
judgment, which sister States will do only if the first State had jurisdiction.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (“State 
preclusion rules should control the matters that originally litigated in that State”).  
185 Milwaukee Cnty. v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). 
 
 




judgments rendered by the courts of one state would not be ignored by the courts of other states.186 
In Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,187 the Court clearly said  
 
Article 4, s 1, not only commands that “full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State” but 
it adds “Congress may be general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, 
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” And Congress 
has exercised this power, by Act of May 26, 1790, c. 11, 28 U.S.C. s 687, 28 USCA 
s 687, which provides the manner of proof of judgments of one State in the courts 
of another, and specifically directs that judgments “shall have such faith and credit 
given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage 
in the courts of the State from which they are taken.”188 
 
In addition, the Constitution has granted additional power to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign defendant only if legislatures have authorized the courts by: (1) statutory 
authorization to states through states’ long-arm statutes; and (2) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.189 
Long-arm statutes authorize states to exercise their jurisdiction to the full extent allowed under the 
Due Process Clause.190 State long-arm statutes fall within a notion of “law of the nation” because 
the law of the nation does not prevent a state from exercising jurisdiction over its citizens whether 
they are travelling or residing abroad or residing in the state.191  
It is clear from the framers’ intent that the constitutional provision convincingly shows that 
the state courts can assert general jurisdiction over [an orb-web corporation] under the presence 
model.192 However, the minimum contacts model serves no appropriate function even though the 
Court recognized it as a constitutional mandate.193 Hence, the sketch of the objective provides that 
whether a corporation is present, in one state or another, it does not make any significant difference 
in asserting jurisdiction if the first court has personal jurisdiction.194  
                                                 
186 Id. at 273. 
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
189 BORN RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 81-83 (5th ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter RUTLEDGE]. 
190 Id. 
191 U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”).  
192 See infra Parts II., III. 
193 Id.; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927-28 (“A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sort within a State,’” 
International Shoe instructed, “‘is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits 
unrelated to that activity.’” Our 1952 decision in Perkins remains “[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction 
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum” (citation omitted)).  
194 See sources cited supra note 4-8, 76. 
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Assume for a moment that all foreign subsidiaries were separate and distinct entities as the 
Court viewed them in Goodyear, and the constitutional guarantee and the framers’ intent were 
ignored completely.195 The fundamental concern with personal jurisdiction models is that they 
stem from the Court’s decisions in two pre-industrial era cases.196 However, recently it became 
the prerogative of practitioners to embrace business law, corporate law, international law, 
comparative law, product liability law, conflict of law, and economic models when determining 
substantial and systematic contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over such orb-web 
corporations.197 Thus, our established jurisprudential philosophies do not provide any platform for 
the United States’ plaintiffs to sue such orb-web corporations.  
The Court’s articulation of the minimum contacts model became more prominent and raised 
concerns in recent cases that warrant a changed approach: (1) Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown,198 (2) Daimler AG v. Bauman,199(3) J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,200 (4) 
BNSF R. CO. v. Tyrrell,201  and (5) Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. San 
Francisco Cty.202 In these cases, the Court completely overlooked the distinction between the 
factual situations in Pennoyer and International Shoe and that in Goodyear, McIntyre, Bauman, 
and Bristol-Myers Squibb. As noted, our specific and general jurisdiction tests, under the minimum 
contacts model, are circular, and failed to accommodate jurisdictional sphere over orb-web 
corporate defendants.203 Since the Court ignored the distinction, these principal cases have 
signaled a serious need for a re-routed approach in personal jurisdiction analysis.204 
Another concern with the established models is that they are misguiding to lower state 
courts and directed often towards an unfortunate outcome. For example, in Goodyear, the North 
Carolina Trial Court concluded general jurisdiction over Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries based on 
                                                 
195 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929 (stating that “[m]easured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is 
not a forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction”); See also infra Parts II., 
III.   
196 See supra Part I.A.1-2.; McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 887 (Bayer J., concurring) (stating that the “Supreme Court 
of New Jersey adopted a broad understanding of the scope of personal jurisdiction based on its view that ‘[t]he 
increasingly fast-paced globalization of the world economy has removed national borders as barriers to trade.’...there 
have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our 
precedents” (citation omitted)).  
197 See supra Part I.A.C. 
198 Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915. 
199 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746. 
200 McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873 
201 BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct 1549. 
202 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. 1773. 
203 See supra Part I.A.1. 
204 See supra Part I.A. 
 
 




affidavits and evidence presented.205 This case presented two problems. First, the state courts 
followed the state laws.206 Second, the state courts followed established models of jurisdiction.207 
For example, in Goodyear, the trial court used the term “quality of the defendant’s contacts, which 
include systematic and repeated contacts with the state of North Carolina for the purpose of 
commerce along with the defendants’ ownership by U.S. corporations doing substantial business 
in North Carolina, weighs in favor of finding general jurisdiction over the defendants.”208 The 
appellate court concluded that a state court might assert personal jurisdiction without altering or 
departing from the essential character or a function of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
(or Fifth) Amendment.209 Despite the adequacy of the lower courts’ reasoning, the Court said that 
the North Carolina State courts do not have jurisdiction based on the established models. It is 
apparent that the lower courts followed an indirect approach to assert jurisdiction.210 
The Due Process Clause never mentioned the minimum contacts model.211 To be sure, the 
Court states that all assertions of a state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated per the standards set 
forth in International Shoe and its progeny.212 Nevertheless, this phrase is too ambiguous to sustain 
the conclusion that the framers and Congress intended to measure due process through the 
minimum contacts model. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as that of the pre-
Pennoyer cases contains no reference to the term “minimum contacts.”213  
In the years since International Shoe was decided, a survey of cases reflects that the states’ 
courts often follow their own precedents under long arm statutes, which doubtlessly receive little 
or no attention,214 during the United States Supreme Court’s appellate review. If a foreign 
                                                 
205 Brown v. Meter, No. 05 CVS 1922, 2008 WL 8187601, at *1-3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2008), aff’d, 
Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50, 55 (2009), aff’d, 364 N.C. 128 (2010), rev’d sub nom., Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).  
206 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-74.4(1)(d); Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50 (citing Cameron-Brown Co. v. Daves, 
83 N.C. App. 281 (1986)); Long v. Long, 157 N.C. App. 703 (2003); Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 64 N.C. App. 
41 (1983); Nicastro v. McIntyre Mech. Am. Ltd., 399 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Paradise 
Vill, 395 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2007)).  
207 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1987); Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1979); 
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co. 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
208 Meter, 199 N.C. Ct. App. at 57. 
209 Id.  
210 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
211 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
212 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted).  
213 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, 2.  
214 See, e.g., Meter, 199 N.C. App. at 57-58 (citation omitted) (“Although a determination of whether the 
required minimum contacts are present necessarily hinges upon the facts of each case, there are several factors a trial 
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corporation (or a foreign-born, orb-web corporation) incorporates a subsidiary in the United States 
and if the foreign parent still owns the trademark, then the subsidiary cannot get a trademark in the 
United States.215 Likewise, the same is true for a U.S.-born orb-web corporation’s foreign 
subsidiaries.216 Therefore, it is clear that the parent and subsidiaries are explicitly connected with 
each other.  
Consequently, this Article examines the policies underlying due process to determine its 
proper application in orb-web corporations. Since Pennoyer and International Shoe, many 
personal jurisdiction cases filed in state courts resulted in wasting the state judiciary’s time and 
resources, as they did not demonstrate comity or federalism at all.217 Nevertheless, plaintiffs wish 
to file a case against or-web corporations in state courts even though the Court already has 
predetermined a no jurisdiction rule.218 Because our existing jurisdictional laws did not precisely 
define when the amount of controversy does not meet the threshold limit to assert federal diversity 
jurisdiction, a plaintiff has no recourse except to file the case in state courts.219  
 
II. GENERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE PRESENCE MODEL: U.S. BORN, ORB-WEB CORPORATIONS  
A. Presence: A Citizenship Theory  
 
Theoretically, citizenship of an individual is determined by where the person is domiciled 
and intends to remain indefinitely.220 On the other hand, determination of a corporation’s 
                                                 
court typically evaluates in determining whether the required level of contacts exists: (1) quantity of the contacts 
between the defendant and the forum State, (2) quality and nature of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the 
cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest in the forum State, and (5) convenience of the parties.”). 
215 See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
216 Kmart Corp. v. Cartler, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 287-88 (1988) (“...prohibits importing into the United States 
any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a 
corporation or association created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark 
Office by a person domiciled in the United States, ...unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced 
at the time of making entry” (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a).). 
217 Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 (1996) (“a new theory of State sovereign immunity, the 
dissent develops its own vision of the political system created by the Framers, concluding with the Statement that 
‘[t]he Framers’ principal objectives in rejecting English theories of unitary sovereign...would have been impeded if a 
new concept of sovereign immunity had taken its place in federal-question cases, and would have been substantially 
thwarted if that new immunity had been held untouchable by any congressional effort to abrogate it.’”).  
218 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The plurality seems to State strict rules that limit 
jurisdiction where a defendant does not ‘inten[d] to submit to the power of a sovereign’ and cannot ‘be said to have 
targeted the forum.’ But what do those standards mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its 
Web site? And does it matter if, instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products through 
an intermediary who then receives and fulfills the orders?” (international citation omitted)). 
219 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a). § 1332 has an amount in controversy requirement of $75,000. In Goodyear, the 
plaintiff only sued for $10,000. Thus, it is likely that the plaintiff did not meet the amount in controversy.  
220 See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 383 (1904) (describing that a natural person 
must be citizen of the United States); U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1; Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914) 
(describing that a natural person must be a domiciliary of a State). 
 
 




citizenship serves two purposes: (1) it shows a corporation’s affiliation with the state for choice of 
law, and (2) it helps to determine forum selection for orb-web or multinational corporations.221 “A 
corporation created by a State, ...[is] capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as 
a natural person.”222  
However, corporations are generally domiciled or “at home” in at least two places: (1) their 
state of incorporation, and (2) their principal place of business.223 Our courts, however, recognized 
only two places where a corporation can be at home.224 Recently, the Court added that “the exercise 
of general jurisdiction is not limited to these forums; in an ‘exceptional case,’ a corporate 
defendant's operations in another forum “‘may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render 
the corporation at home in that State.’”225 
Additionally, courts failed to provide a proper analysis for a corporation’s state of 
incorporation under the presence model. The law under which it is organized determines a capacity 
of a corporation to sue or to be sued.226 Accordingly, domiciles of orb-web corporations are distinct 
and separate from domiciles of individuals or single-domestic corporations.227  
Focusing on the rationale of state of incorporation, it would certainly be fair to sue the 
U.S.-born parent corporation (or an orb-web corporation) in the United States, the country whose 
law is responsible for a birth of entire orb-web-construction: parent and its affiliated subsidiaries. 
Additionally, when a corporation is present in the United States through incorporation, it can never 
violate the Due Process Clause to defend a lawsuit in its home (or a lawsuit arising on a different 
continent). Because the Fourteenth Amendment says, “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
state wherein they reside.”228 Thus, the law suggests that all U.S.-born orb-web corporations may 
have multiple citizenships rather than just dual citizenships.  
Some courts have repeatedly held that to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, 
a complaint must include allegations of both the state of incorporation and the principal place of 
business.229 A common law principle supports this thesis further: When a parent corporation is 
                                                 
221 See supra text accompanying notes 172-180. 
222 Cf. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844). 
223 See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 130.  
224 See id.  
225 BSNF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1558 (citing Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.19). 
226 See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). 
227 See generally A. Pillet, Jurisdictions in Actions Between Foreigners, 18 HARV. L. REV. 325 (1905) 
(describing whether our courts treat the foreigners or the associations as subject on principle to the same rules of 
jurisdiction as natural persons); see Mary Twitchell, A Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 633 
(1988) (stating that with respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are bases 
for general jurisdiction).  
228 U.S. CONST. art XIV, § 1. 
229 See, e.g., Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970) (faulting 
plaintiffs’ failure to affirmatively allege State of incorporation); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1208 n. 12 (3d ed. 2004) (listing cases requiring pleading of both State or States of incorporation 
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incorporated in a forum state, the state court can assert general in personam jurisdiction for a cause 
of action occurring anywhere in the United States (or in the world).230 However, the courts have 
never addressed the question: which states of incorporations and which principal places of 
businesses should be considered when determining the citizenship?231 To that end, the Court treats 
each state of incorporation as a separate corporation under established state business laws.232 But 
the orb, as a parent corporation, is responsible for the blooming of the entire web corporations. 
As noted, the Court treats civil cases differently than environmental cases. In 
environmental cases, the Court has established that “any person who operates a polluting facility 
is directly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution...regardless of whether that person is the 
facility’s owner [or] the owner’s parent corporation.”233 It is clear that in environmental cases, our 
courts do not mind whether the parent corporation is located in the United States or not because 
Congress has enacted the statute to address the issue.234  
In civil cases, however, the Court follows “separate and distinct” principles. Like in 
environmental cases, in tort cases, an orb-web-parent corporation certainly satisfies citizenship 
language. In addition, courts have an authority to exercise jurisdiction if it possesses statutory 
authorization derived from a federal statute, 15 U.S.C. § 22, or from a state statute of general 
application.235 Thus, a state’s long arm statute may furnish a mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction 
in both federal as well as state courts.236 Furthermore, Rule 4(k)(2) authorizes the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity jurisdiction cases to the limits of due 
process.237  
Assume that the orb-web-parent corporation is distinct and separate from its subsidiaries, 
which not only violates many ethical stand points under quid pro quo terms, but also certainly 
                                                 
and location of principal place of business).  
230 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723. 
231 See, e.g., Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-448 (stating that the company had only one headquarter and principal 
place of business). 
232 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (stating that rights and obligations of 
corporations should be governed by State laws). 
233 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 65 (1998) (internal citation omitted).  
234 See id.  
235 United States v. Swiss Am. Bank Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1999) (“A court need not even consider 
them unless it possesses statutory authorization to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over defendants of the type 
that the plaintiff targets. This authorization may derive from a federal statute, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 22 (providing for 
worldwide service of process on certain corporate antitrust defendants), or from a State statute of general 
application…. A State long-arm statute furnishes a mechanism for obtaining personal jurisdiction in federal as well 
as State court.”). 
236 Cf. Omni Capitol Int’l v. Rudol Wolf & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 106 (1987) (stating that “[s]ection 22, however, 
is silent as to service of process,” and it would appear that Congress knows how to authorize nationwide service of 
process when it wants to provide for it. That Congress failed to do so here argues forcefully that such authorization 
was not its intention.).  
237 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
 
 




conflicts with most states’ long-arm statutes and federal rules on long arm statute granting 
nationwide jurisdiction to sue an orb-web corporation born in the United States. 238 
 
1. An Orb-Web Corporation’s Multiple States of Incorporation: Which State of  
  Incorporation Should Be Considered as “Essentially at Home”? 
 
Generally, an orb-web corporation has more than one (a) principal place of business, (b) 
State of incorporation, (c) headquarters, and (d) subsidiary.239Among all these recent cases, 
Goodyear presents a good example of [parent] corporations’ orb in the United States because the 
“essentially at home” devil disembarked from Goodyear. In Goodyear, the issue raised was 
whether foreign subsidiaries of the United States based parent corporation were amenable to suit 
in state courts on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in a forum state?240 The 
plaintiffs were administrators of two youth soccer players from North Carolina. Both players were 
killed in France while travelling in a bus to the airport and on their way to North Carolina.241 At 
that time, one of the defective tires, separated from it plies; the bus pulled off the roadway, and 
flipped over.242 Both youths’ administrators filed an action in a North Carolina trial court against 
the Meter North Carolina soccer team, French soccer team, Goodyear Lastikeri T.A.S, Goodyear 
Luxembourg Tires SA, Goodyear Dunlop Tires France SA, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 
USA (Goodyear), and its affiliated branches.243  
The foreign defendants (subsidiaries) were Goodyear USA’s subsidiaries.244 Goodyear 
USA245 contended that the ties between the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and Goodyear 
France, Goodyear Luxembourg, and Goodyear Turkey, respectively were indirect.246 The 
                                                 
238 See supra text accompanying notes 181-193. 
239 See supra diagram I. 
240 Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915. 
241 Id.  
242 See id. 
243 Brown, supra note 164, at 1-3 (indicating that the plaintiff properly served the defendants Goodyear 
Turkey, Goodyear France and Goodyear Luxembourg); see The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, The Hague Convention Art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.  
244 Meter, supra note 204, 199 N.C. App. at 55; see Global Presence, GOODYEAR CORPORATE, 
http://www.goodyear.com/corporate/about/facilities.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2017) (stating that Goodyear 
subsidiaries has a principle place of business in Akron, OH. Goodyear had plants in North Carolina, and regularly 
engaged in commercial activity there. Goodyear claims that as a global corporate citizen, Goodyear takes its 
responsibility seriously.).  
245 See Richard J. Kramer, GOODYEAR CORPORATE, http://www.goodyear.com/corporate/bios/kramer.html 
(stating that Rich Kramer is Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company. He has been Chairman since October 1, 2010 and President and Chief Executive Officer since April 13, 
2010. He has been a member of Goodyear’s Board of Directors since February 23, 2010.).  
246 Meter, supra note 204, 199 N.C. App. at 54, n.4. According to Mr. Kramer’s deposition, sales & 
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defendants argued that the Goodyear Turkey Regional Plant manufactured the defective tire that 
was exclusive to that region.247 Nevertheless, the record showed that Goodyear owned 100% of 
Goodyear operations stocks.248 Goodyear’s global enterprise has deep and longstanding roots in 
North Carolina, registered to do business in North Carolina since 1956, and maintained, owned, 
and operated three large tire and tire mold manufacturing plants in North Carolina.249 
Furthermore, the record revealed that once a request to supply products was made through the 
Goodyear enterprise, and products were produced, whether the plant was located in Turkey or in 
North Carolina, and delivered through a distribution process handled through three channels--
original equipment, replacement, or export.250  
Goodyear subsidiaries were incorporated in many States in the United States and expanded 
into six continents, but Goodyear and its subsidiaries’ origination, direction, control, and 
coordination were from the corporation’s orb, located in Ohio. Hence, the Goodyear subsidiaries 
could have a fair opportunity to be sued in Ohio.251 Turning to the question of State of 
incorporation, Goodyear North Carolina was incorporated in North Carolina, but had its principal 
place of business in New York.252 Like Goodyear USA, all Goodyear branches (subsidiaries) are 
incorporated and have a principal place of business in at at-least two States (countries or 
continents): (a) where they are incorporated; (b) where they have principal places of business; and 
                                                 
marketing offices that develop business plans, sales plans, and determine how the needs associated with those plans 
would be met. Goodyear’s sales marketing office would decide how to obtain from a European affiliate. After making 
this determination, the needed tires would be manufactured, shipped to the United States, and distributed to retailers 
and similar entities using Goodyear’s existing distribution system. Moreover, Mr. Kramer made clear that the 
defendants do not send tires into the United States for distribution, but Goodyear makes that determination in this 
country. Furthermore, Kramer Stated that these tires are not sold in the United States regularly, but the modified 
versions were imported in 2006 when a strike closed the American plant that ordinarily produced them. Goodyear 
needed to import these tires into NC because Goodyear did “not have a source here. Kramer also said that the 
manufacturers did not have their own distribution system for the sale of their tires, but instead used their Goodyear 
parent and affiliated companies to distribute the tires they manufactured to the United States and to NC.  
247 See Brown, supra note 106, at 1-2 (describing that defendant Goodyear [Turkey] is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Goodyear. However, the plaintiff’s pleading states that Goodyear [Turkey] is a Turkish corporation with 
its principal place of business in Turkey).   
248 See Brief for Respondents at 8, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) 
(No. 10-76), 2010 WL 5125441, at *4.  
249 Brief for Respondents at 5, supra note 204, at 2 (“Goodyear’s global enterprise has deep and long- 
standing roots in North Carolina. Goodyear has been registered to do business there since 1956 and maintains a 
registered agent in Raleigh. It also owns and operates three large tire and tire-mold manufacturing plants in 
Fayetteville, Statesville, and Asheboro, North Carolina” (citing Dep’t of the Secretary of State, N.C, available at 
http://www.secretary.State.nc.us/corporations/Corp.aspx?PitemI d=5030445 [listing for “Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company”].).   
250 Brief for Respondents at 9, supra note 204, at 6 (stating that Mr. Kramer admitted that tires manufactured 
at Goodyear Luxembourg’s plant had also been requested, brought into, and sold by Goodyear Luxembourg through 
the Goodyear enterprise in NC for use on cement mixers, waste haulers, and front-end loaders). 
251 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.  
252 See id.  
 
 




(c) their permanent identity, at their orb, in Ohio. 253 Even though the orb-web subsidiaries 
generally operate away from home, the parent and subsidiaries are connected with each other 
horizontally, vertically, and centrally with the orb-web parent corporation. Therefore, the 
subsidiaries would not exist independently.  
 As the Court held, the corporation is present in its home or principle place of business 
where the corporate activities are continuous and systematic.254 Due Process requires that an out-
of-State defendant can be sued if the lawsuit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”255 “Fair play and substantial justice” allows a U.S. plaintiff to sue a U.S.-based 
orb-web parent, which deliberately controls its corporate form in order to secure its advantages; it 
would be inequitable to shield the liabilities raised by naming its subsidiaries as non-resident-
corporate defendants.256  
Another great example presented in a very recent case, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. Bristol-
Myers Squibb is a fortune 500 pharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware and 
headquartered in New York.257 The company employs 25,000 worldwide and generates 15 
billion.258 The California Supreme Court noted that Bristol-Myers Squibb “d[id] not contest that 
its marketing, promotion, and distribution of Plavix was nationwide and was associated with 
California-based sales representatives.”259 Additionally, BMS had a contract with McKesson 
Corporation, co-defendant in this case. McKesson is headquartered in San Francisco.260  
The Court said that although BMS engaged in business activities in California and sold 
Plavix there, “BMS did not develop, create a marketing strategy for, manufacture, label, package, 
                                                 
253 See SEC Charges Goodyear With FCPA Violations, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 24, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-38.html.  
254 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (describing that International Shoe involved State forum court); 
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the 
individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at 
home.” (citing Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 728 (identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of 
business as “paradig[m]” bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction))); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (stating that the 
rationales of the Pennoyer and Harris decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled, but when 
asserting jurisdiction over a corporation in a State court, the court must follow the test set forth in International Shoe).  
255 See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
256 United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 813-16 (1948) (stating that a foreign parent could 
be “found” in the United States because of its “constant supervisions and intervention” in the activities of its U.S. 
subsidiaries going well “beyond normal exercise of shareholder’s rights.”); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930 (stating that 
the plaintiffs failed to identify the defendants’ “discrete status as subsidiaries and treatment of all Goodyear entities 
as a ‘unitary business,’ so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw in the subsidiaries as well”). 
257 Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court noted 
the facts that the company advertised and distributed nationwide).  
258 See id. at 1773, 1778, 1781.  
259 Id. at 1779, 1781 
260 See id.  
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or work on the regulatory approval for Plavix in the State.”261 Additionally, “the nonresident 
plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix from a California source, that they were injured 
by Plavix in California, or that they were treated for their injuries in California.”262 This was a new 
requirement added by the Court. The dissenting Justice said,  
 
it is difficult to imagine where it might be possible to bring a nationwide mass 
action against two or more defendants headquartered and incorporated in different 
States. There will be no State where both defendants are “at home,” and so no State 
in which the suit can proceed. What about a nationwide mass action brought against 
a defendant not headquartered or incorporated in the United States? Such a 
defendant is not “at home” in any State.263 
 
International Shoe only suggests that a subsidiary located in the United States can be sued 
to assert jurisdiction over its parent corporation (and its other affiliated branches or units).264 Thus, 
the courts can fairly ask in return for general jurisdiction of the State courts (or federal courts in 
appropriate circumstances, if proper diversity is established).265 However, in recent cases, the 
Court recognized that the subsidiaries are distinct corporate entities even though they are not 
separate from the orb at all.266 In one way or another, these subsidiaries or branches get many 
benefits from the parent corporation--substantially, systematically, and continuously.267 
 
2. An Orb-Web Corporation’s Principal Places of Business: Which Principal  
 Place of Business Should Be Considered as a “Perkins Textbook Case”? 
 
Like the State of incorporation, a principal place of business also presents a critical 
challenge to lower courts and practitioners because the Court has never clarified which principal 
place of business should be focused on to determine an orb-web corporation’s actual business 
activities for jurisdictional purposes. For example, in Goodyear, the Court held that Perkins v. 
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.268 remains the textbook case for general jurisdiction 
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.269 
The Court said that unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was 
                                                 
261 See id.  
262 Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
263 Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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267 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, n.9.  
268 Goodyear, 564 U.S at 928 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). 
269 See id. (internal citation omitted). 
 
 




conducted in Ohio, the Goodyear subsidiaries are in no sense at home in North Carolina.270 The 
Court in Goodyear said that Goodyear subsidiaries lacked the kind of continuous and systematic 
general business contacts necessary to allow North Carolina to entertain a suit against them 
unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.271  
In Perkins, the foreign defendant, Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., operated gold and 
silver mines in the Philippines, and ceased its operation during World War II.272 The mining 
company’s president returned to his Ohio hometown and maintained an office, conducted business 
for the corporation, kept corporate records, deposited company funds in an Ohio bank, designated 
the Ohio bank as a transfer agent for the corporation’s stock, paid his own salary and the salaries 
of two Ohio-based secretaries, and organized directors’ meetings at his home office in Ohio 
without registering to do business in Ohio.273 As general manager, he supervised policies dealing 
with the rehabilitation of the corporation’s properties in the Philippines and dispatched funds to 
cover purchases for corporate rehabilitation from his Ohio office.274 He carried on a continuous 
and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company by 
discharging his duties as president and general manager. 275 Although the company did not have 
any mining properties in Ohio, the company directed many of its wartime activities from Ohio at 
the time he was served with summons.276  
In Perkins, the Court said that the Ohio court had ultimate power to determine jurisdiction 
over the foreign corporation because the foreign corporation’s president “ha[d] been carrying on a 
continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business from Ohio,” and the exercise 
of general jurisdiction over the Philippine corporation by an Ohio court was “reasonable and 
just.”277 The Court also concluded that the foreign corporation’s activities in Ohio made the Ohio 
office as the corporation’s “principal place of business.”278  
However, the Court in Goodyear failed to see, among other things, that World War II 
influenced the Perkins decision and subsequent cases would not be decided in the same 
circumstances. First, the magnitude of corporate activities in Perkins was significantly trivial 
compared to the magnitude of activities in Goodyear.279 Second, Perkins only provided a black 
                                                 
270 See id. at 921. 
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272 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-46. 
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line rule for one place of incorporation, only one place of business, the corporation’s  principal 
place of business. In addition, in Perkins, the defendant corporation did not have any other place 
of business compared to today’s extremely complex global corporate web such as Goodyear and 
its subsidiaries. Third, in Perkins, Ohio was the company’s tentative place of business while the 
company was still recouping its activities in Philippines. On the other hand, many Goodyear 
subsidiaries are incorporated and doing business in the United States and abroad, having world 
headquarters in the United States and at least three other headquarters on three different 
continents.280  
The factual situation in Perkins is akin to a small-rural-town vendor operating a store (X) 
and keeping the store goods in his house or warehouse, both within the town (Y). For example, the 
vendor expands his business by opening another store in town (X1), or a neighboring town (or a 
neighboring State, country, or continent) and earns profits, makes purchases, pays rents and 
salaries, but operates and oversees it through one of his relatives, family members or a third person, 
and pockets the profits? Can the store in town X1 (or the State, or the country, or the continent) be 
“at home” in town X (or the State or the country or the continent)? As you see from this simple 
hypothetical, it is not possible. But both stores share the same owner. However, this information 
can only be proved by extensive discovery.  
What if the same vendor starts the same type of store, with his name, in another State (X1)? 
Can X1 be “at home” in the first State? Under the principle stated in Goodyear, store X1 may 
satisfy the minimum contacts model, but more likely, it cannot satisfy the “at home” test because 
store X1 is not in the forum State (X). In Perkins, the defendant could satisfy the “at home” test 
because he operated in the same town as illustrated in the hypothetical and did not have the parent-
subsidiaries bond that orb-web corporations share.  
As in Perkins, if a corporation’s headquarters and executive offices are in the same State 
in which it does most of its business, it would be the corporation’s principal place of business.281 
Many companies’ corporate headquarters, including executive offices, are in one State or country, 
while the corporation’s plants or other centers of business activity are located in other States or 
countries.282 The factual situations presented in Goodyear and Perkins show that the “at home” 
test should not be raised in case of orb-web corporations, which are webbed out in multiple 
principal places of business and multiple States of incorporation. So far, the courts have addressed 
a corporation’s principal place of business or State of incorporation for jurisdictional purpose.283 
However, the Court has never addressed which headquarters is the principal place of business 
because there is no precedent established on this point until today.  
One court concluded that a corporation’s principal office rather than a factory, mill, or 
mine...constitutes the principal place of business.284 Another court found that “principal place of 
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business” refers to the place where a corporation’s officers actually direct, control, and coordinate 
the corporation’s activities, the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters and which 
is not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.285  
As a textual matter, the Court did not address which principal place of business should be 
considered when there are many. In addition, how do the “at home” and the substantial, systematic, 
and continuous contacts tests merge? The “at home” analysis requires courts to follow the 
minimum contacts model while the substantial, systematic, and continues contacts test requires 
courts to follow the presence model. Looking closely at both models, the minimum contacts model 
is used as an alternative approach to determine jurisdiction, but the presence model provides a 
direct approach to assert jurisdiction. In short, these vivid approaches adapted by the courts 
illustrate that courts are neither settled on an approach nor suggest any likelihood of settling in the 
future if they continue to follow the established precedents.  
 
3. “Substantial, Systematic, and Continuous Contacts”: Helicopteros Nacionales  
 de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall 
 
Recently, in Goodyear, the Court also followed Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 
v. Hall as a twin case of Perkins.286 In Helicopteros, a wrongful death claim was initiated, in the 
Texas State court against a Columbian corporation having its principal place of business in 
Columbia.287 This issue commenced from a helicopter crash in Columbia.288 The defendant made 
trips to Texas, purchased approximately four million dollars or 80% of the defendant’s fleet and 
related items, and paid approximately five million dollars, within seven years of its business 
relationship with Helicol.289 The State court concluded that Helicol’s purchase of over four million 
dollars’ worth of equipment and regular training of pilots constituted sufficient contacts.290 But 
the Court held that the contacts were not substantial, systematic, and continuous general business 
contacts like the defendant’s contacts in Perkins; therefore, the forum court could not assert 
jurisdiction.291 Nowhere in the opinion, however, did the Court address what “substantial, 
systematic, and continuous” meant, but said that a four million dollars’ worth of business was not 
substantial.292  
Some courts have developed a relative approach to determine what is substantial, 
                                                 
285 Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 92; Wisconsin Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th 
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systematic, and continuous contacts under Helicopteros, which gave birth to the relative approach 
theory.293 Both International Shoe and Helicopteros were decided under the minimum contacts 
model; therefore, this relative approach is irrelevant in establishing the “at home” test.294 Because 
one of impediments to using the minimum contacts model is the distinction between the general 
and specific jurisdiction, the model must be abandoned.295While Helicopteros and Perkins may 
arguably have presented an interesting illustration of the substantial, systematic, and continues 
contacts test, both cases were distinct and limited to specific context.296 Hence, these cases do not 
support State courts’ jurisdiction under the citizenship theory.297  
 
4. Relative Approach Theories  
 
There are, at least, three approaches developed under the relative approach theories.298 The 
first theory is the place of operation theory, in which a corporation’s physical presence in different 
States such as corporation’s multiple centers of manufacturing, purchasing, or sales can be 
presumed as a principal place of business.299 Obviously, it undermines its applicability in an orb-
web corporation because a corporation might divide its production facilities and principal places 
of businesses into segments.300  
For example, in Goodyear, Goodyear USA owned 52 production facilities, in 22 countries, 
with approximately 62,000 employees, which operated in four segments, covering a worldwide 
operation.301 In addition, each segment had a headquarter and State of incorporation.302 Each 
Goodyear subsidiary has at least two States of incorporation (one in Ohio and one in another 
country or continent) and at least two principal places of businesses. Goodyear USA also maintains 
executive and administrative functions in those respective States or nations. But in Ohio, it has a 
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activities test focuses on the location of the corporation’s tangible assets”).  
300 See infra note 389 and accompanying text.  
301 See Our Company, GOODYEAR CORPORATE, http://www.goodyear.com/corporate/about/glance.html (last 
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principal place of business as well its birth place, i.e., principal State of incorporation.303 Thus, 
Goodyear USA, as an entire orb-web corporation, has multiple principal places of businesses and 
multiple State-of-incorporations, a scenario not supported by our existing precedents.  
The second theory is the “nerve center test” established in Hertz Corp. v. Friend.304 In 
Hertz, the Court standardized the “nerve-center test” to determine a corporation’s principal place 
of business, but did not answer when a corporation has many principal places of businesses and 
when a plaintiff can assert jurisdiction in the State courts. 305 Thus, the nerve-center test is not 
supportive because Hertz involved the federal forum. In addition, if a corporation is winged out in 
an orb-web form, it is difficult for a U.S. plaintiff to bring a case in federal forum under diversity 
jurisdiction for a U.S.-based orb-web corporation.  
The third theory is the far-flung theory as developed by a prominent Judge Edward 
Weinfeld who articulated that 
 
where a corporation is engaged in far-flung and varied activities, which are carried 
on in different States, its principal place of business is the nerve center from which 
it radiates out to its constituent parts and from which its officers direct, control, and 
coordinate all activities without regard to locale, in the furtherance of the corporate 
                                                 
303 See Corporate Responsibility, GOODYEAR CORPORATE, 
http://www.goodyear.com/responsibility/introduction-company-profile.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).  
Looking back, the founding of The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company in 1898 seems especially 
remarkable, for the beginning was anything but auspicious. The 38-year-old founder, Frank A. 
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This theory may be relevant in an orb-web corporation’s settings, but the court limited its analysis 
to United States based corporations.  
 
5. The Incorrect Mixture Rule: A Merger of the Presence and Minimum Contacts  
 Models  
 
Courts and litigators should seize an opportunity to clear the jurisprudential cloud in this 
area because neither State nor federal courts have made it clear in which situations they can 
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-State corporation based on the presence of subsidiary 
corporations within the United States.307 Under the current approach, presence and State of 
incorporation are determined upon the minimum contacts with a State, but this approach looked 
only at the magnitude of activities (the relative approach theory).308  
As noted, this test may be relevant for an orb-web corporation, but it is limited to one 
principal place of business. For example, in High Ridge Park Assoc. v. NYCOM Information Serv. 
Inc.,309 NYCOM, the defendant, was an operator and provider of a long-distance telephone service 
having 240 employees, all of whom were in Florida.310 The senior officers and directors of the 
company, however, were in Connecticut.311 The High Ridge Court held that Connecticut was the 
principal place of business because the Stamford Connecticut office was responsible for running 
the daily operations of NYCOM, as well as formulating the overall business strategy.312 The 
Stamford office was responsible for press releases, management decisions, hiring personnel, legal 
and regulatory work, answering shareholder and investor inquiries and requests, and overseeing 
[the subsidiaries’] operations.313 In High Ridge, there were only 240 employees, so it is easy to 
keep them all in one town (or city); but the same is not true in the case of Goodyear or other U.S. 
based orb-web corporations.  
Earlier, in Perkins, the “substantial business contacts” involved only three-employees and 
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dissenting). 
307 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Schwartz, Piercing the Corporate Veil of an Alien Parent for Jurisdictional 
Purposes: A Proposal for a Standard that Comports With Due Process, 96 CAL. L. REV. 731, 744 (2008); 
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir.  2004) (stating that retaining direct-mail 
marketing and sales training companies in California insufficient to create general jurisdiction); Congoleum Corp. v. 
DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1984) (indicating that hiring of independent sales promotion 
representatives and consultants does not create general jurisdiction).  
308 Professor Cercone, supra note 20.  
309 High Ridge Park Assoc. v. NYCOM Information Serv. Inc., 821 F. Supp. 835 (D. Conn. 1993). 
310 See id. at 838.  
311 Id.  
312 Id.  
313 Id.  
 
 




corporate activities at the corporation’s one and only place of business.314 However, in 
Helicopteros, four million dollars’ worth of business transactions were not substantial.315 
Likewise, in Goodyear, sending approximately 45,000 tires over three years to a sister subsidiary 
in North Carolina was not substantial.316 In International Shoe, the Court upheld significant 
presence over a non-consenting corporation when only eleven of its employees were engaged in  
corporate activities.317 In Consolidated Textile Corp., the Court specifically held that in-State sales 
of an absent corporation’s products did not establish the necessary “presence”--even when the 
wholly owned subsidiaries made sales in the forum.318 Indeed, the facts in Goodyear were even 
more compelling, even though, in Consolidated Textile Corp., the defendant directly caused the 
sales in the forum as such in Goodyear’s subsidiaries, but in Goodyear, the Court approached this 
argument from the other direction.  
The relative approach theory causes the lower State courts to fall into the trap of analyzing 
both specific and general jurisdiction.319 For example, in Goodyear, the Court said   
 
Confusing or blending general and specific jurisdictional inquiries, the North 
Carolina courts answered yes. Some of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign 
subsidiaries, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stressed, had reached North 
Carolina through “the stream of commerce”; that connection, the Court of Appeals 
believed, gave North Carolina courts the handle needed for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over the foreign corporations.320  
 
The North Carolina trial court did not confuse itself with the mixture rule under the 
presence and minimum contacts models as the Court claimed. As a matter of fact, first, the North 
Carolina State court examined the statutory authorization to sue the so-called “foreign defendants” 
under the “state’s long arm statute” that the Court has set as a requirement to determine whether 
the defendants had minimum contacts with North Carolina.321 Under the minimum contacts model, 
the North Carolina Court was bound to determine whether the case fell within the specific or 
                                                 
314 See supra text and accompanying notes 271-277.  
315 Helicopteros, 446 U.S. at 411-12. 
316 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 921; Brown, supra note 106, at 1-3.  
317 See supra text accompanying notes 55-64. 
318 See Consol. Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 (1933).  
319 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
320 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 921.  
321 Meter, supra note 204, at 57 (stating that due process considerations established in Int’l Shoe prohibits 
our States courts from exercising general jurisdiction unless the defendant has had certain minimum contacts with the 
forum State).   
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general jurisdiction depending upon the number of contacts.322 Thus, establishing jurisdiction 
under the minimum contacts model is not only challenging, but requires proper determination of 
general or specific jurisdiction, which hinges on the application of the minimum contacts model.  
For example, In Tyrrell, the Court said that BNSF was not incorporated in Montana and 
did not maintain its principal place of business there.323 Nor was BNSF so heavily engaged in 
activity in Montana “as to render [it] essentially at home” in that State.324 However, the Court 
noted that BNSF had over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees in 
Montana,” but shifted the focus, stating that “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely 
on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.”325  Furthermore, the Court said that “the 
inquiry ‘calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety’; ‘[a] corporation that 
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”’326 The Court reasoned 
that the business BNSF does in Montana is sufficient to subject the railroad to specific personal 
jurisdiction in that State on claims related to the business it does in Montana.327 However, the 
Court confused the holdings in Daimler and Goodyear, because these precedents did not allow 
“the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims like Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s that are unrelated to 
any activity occurring in Montana.”328 On the other hand, Justice Sotomayer opined that  
 
the majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional windfall to large multistate or 
multinational corporations that operate across many jurisdictions. Under its 
reasoning, it is virtually inconceivable that such corporations will ever be subject 
to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business 
or of incorporation. Foreign businesses with principal places of business outside 
the United States may never be subject to general jurisdiction in this country even 
though they have continuous and systematic contacts within the United States.329 
 
This article suggests that an orb-web corporation’s world headquarters satisfies both the 
State of incorporation and principal place of business to adjudicate any case that arises out of such 
contacts with a U.S.-based parent corporation because “minimum contacts” automatically satisfies 
in such case. In addition, these orb-web corporations can also be sued in any States in which it has 
                                                 
322 Id. at 58 (stating that the dispute is not related to, nor arises from Defendant’s contacts with North 
Carolina, so it is a specific jurisdiction case).  
323 Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. at 1559 (majority opinion) 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
326 Id.  
327 Id.  
328 Id. (internal citation omitted).  
329 Id., at 1560 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting). 
 
 




subsidiaries or business offices in the United States under Rule 4(k)(1)(A).330 Although there is no 
simple formula to provide an answer to the principal place of business inquiry, the Court’s 
established rules cannot be aligned consistently across the board in all cases.331 Thus, re-routing is 
needed with the existing laws.332  
 
B. Presence: A Parent-Subsidiary Relationship Theory 
 
Under the traditional theory, an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property 
suggests presence because Pennoyer rested on the premise that a proceeding “against” property is 
a proceeding against the owners of that property unless service of process is not proper.333 In orb-
web corporation cases, a question arises whether jurisdiction can be asserted over a parent 
corporation or subsidiary if the parent or subsidiary does business or is registered to do business 
in the forum State.  
Under the agency theory, a parent corporation is constructively present through the 
subsidiary to such degree that it would be fundamentally fair to hail the corporate defendants in 
any litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence anywhere in the world.334 In general, all 
corporations must necessarily act through agents, but a wholly owned subsidiary may be an 
agent.335 A principal is responsible for the actions of its agent if the principal and the agent manifest 
assent. 336 
Likewise, a subsidiary doing business of a parent may constitute presence. A corporation 
is “present in a forum State if it does business in the forum State ‘not occasionally or casually, but 
with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.’”337 If an agent (or a subsidiary) is doing 
business of a parent, then the parent is subject to in personam jurisdiction of the state in which the 
activities occurred.338 Solicitation of a business alone, on the other hand, is insufficient to find a 
                                                 
330 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4, 26 
331  Bauman, 134 S. Ct at 773 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that the current “approach would 
preclude the plaintiffs...from seeking recourse anywhere in the United States even if no other judicial system was 
available to provide relief.”).  
332  See supra text and accompanying note 262.  
333 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (invalidating notions of jurisdiction based on a State’s “power” over property of 
a defendant located in the State).  
334 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (stating that “a master is subject to liability for the 
torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”). 
335 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013) (“the most basic features of an agency relationship 
are missing here. Agency requires more than mere authorization to assert a particular interest. An essential element of 
agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s actions” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, 
Comment f (2005)). 
336 United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 506 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). 
337 Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna 
Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 (1917)).  
338 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132, 137 (10th Cir. 1962); D'Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 
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corporate presence in a forum state, but other factors must be present to support jurisdiction.339 A 
parent corporation’s branch offices (or subsidiaries) in a forum state suggest “doing business” and 
that establishes the corporation’s presence. The presumption of corporate separateness must be 
overcome, by clear evidence, that the parent controls activities of its subsidiary.340  
Typically, a parent-subsidiary’s connection, either by doing business or by an agency 
relationship, seems sufficient for a parent-subsidiary’s identity under the presence model.341 By 
itself, a mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is insufficient to establish a principal-
agent relationship between two entities,342 but the plaintiff’s statement would suffice.343 For 
example, in Goodyear, the Court held that the plaintiff, either below or in the brief, must urge [an 
orb web corporation] as a unitary entity so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw the 
subsidiaries as well.344 
 
C. Presence: A Piercing Corporate Veil Theory 
 
In the contemporary setting, a piercing corporate veil in an orb-web corporation is 
controversial. For example, Goodyear stands for the proposition that a court may assert general 
jurisdiction over foreign (sister-State or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims 
against them when they are affiliated essentially at home in the forum State.345 In Goodyear, the 
Court said a connection between the forum and the foreign corporation must be “continuous and 
systematic.”346 In effect, the plaintiff would have to pierce the Goodyear corporate veil, at least 
for jurisdictional purposes.347 So described, the text of the opinion suggests that the corporate veil 
is allowed for the fault of a foreign subsidiary as long as the foreign subsidiary maintains 
continuous contacts. In this view, if relief sought by a U.S. plaintiff against a U.S. subsidiary (or 
a foreign subsidiary) is directed against the U.S. parent orb web corporation, the courts should 
                                                 
F.3d 94, 108-09 (3d Cir. 2009).  
339 Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Serv. Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1990).  
340 Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1983).  
341 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1984); Gallelli 
v. Crown Import LLC., 701 F. Supp 2d. 263 (E.D. N.Y. 2010). 
342 See Flintridge Station Assoc. v. Am. Fletcher Mortgage Co., 761 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing 
Matter of Chrome Plate, Inc., 614 F.2d 990, 996 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
343 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930. 
344 See id.  
345 See id. at 921.  
346 Id. 
347 Id. at 930 (citing Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal 
Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14, 29-30 (1986) (merging parent and 
subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes requires an inquiry “comparable to the corporate law question of piercing the 
corporate veil”).  
 
 




recognize such veil-piercing theory. 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court Rule 29.6 (or similar State court rules) 
mandates that [n]on-governmental corporate parties in “every document filed in the Supreme 
Court proceeding must list the name of all ‘parent corporations’ and any publicly held company 
that owns 10% or more of the corporate stock.348 If there is no parent or publicly held company 
owning 10% or more of a corporation’s stock, a notation to this effect shall be included in the 
documents.349 Under the Court’s enterprise liability doctrine, jurisdiction over a U.S. parent 
corporation can be asserted by a U.S. plaintiff if he or she discloses the corporate disclosure 
statement early in the litigation.350 Surely, a plaintiff may pierce corporate veil as long as the 
plaintiff does not intend to put an orb-web parent corporation out of its existence.351 
 In the traditional setting, the courts dislike piercing corporate veil.352 To that end, one 
court established a two-step inquiry whereby “unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual [or a subsidiary] no longer exist[,]” and when 
“adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote 
injustice.”353 For example, in DeWitt Truck Brokers Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., the court 
noted that independent corporate status may be disregarded when factors such as gross 
undercapitalization, fraud, failure to observe corporate formalities, non-functioning of officers and 
directors, or similar circumstances indicate that the subsidiary is merely the shadow of the 
parent.354  
Some courts follow a “horizontal veil piercing theory,” to sue a brother or a sister 
corporation of an orb-web corporation. For example, in Walkovsky v. Carlton,355 a taxicab hit a 
pedestrian and injured him.356 The pedestrian sued the corporation, which owned the taxicab.357 
The corporation owned nine other corporations and each owned two other taxicabs with minimum 
                                                 
348 SUP. CT. R. 29.6.  
349 SUP. CT. R. 29.6.  
350 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929-30. 
351 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 95 (1926) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“when the sacrifice is so 
essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld.”).  
352 See Alberto v. Diversified Grp., Inc., 55 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that piercing the corporate 
veil is not favored in general, and the courts are reluctant to do so); In re KZK Livestock, Inc., 221 B.R. 471, 478 
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998).  
353 Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 (7th Cir. 1985).  
354 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 96 F.2d 693, 704-05 (10th Cir. 1938), rev’d on other grounds, 
306 U.S. 307 (1939).  
355 Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414 (1966). 
356 Id. at 416. 
357 Id. at 419. 
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insurance coverage required by the State law.358 Moreover, the corporations operated out of the 
same garage in New York City using the same dispatching system.359 The New York Court held 
that the brother or sister corporations were not responsible because the enterprise did not become 
either illicit or fraudulent merely because it consisted ofmany such corporations.360 Carlton 
presents an example of a domestic U.S. corporation.361 Thus, the plaintiff could have been entitled 
under a respondent superior or an agency theory to hold the enterprise responsible for the acts of 
its agents.362  
The alter-ego theory suggests the presence if a parent company exerts substantial control 
over a subsidiary and shares the same integrated distribution system with the subsidiary for 
purposes of asserting jurisdiction.363 To establish jurisdiction  under this theory, the courts consider 
numerous factors: (1) common employees and offices; (2) central accounting system; (3) payment 
of wages by one corporation to another corporation’s employees; (4) common business name; (5) 
services by the employees of one corporation on behalf of another corporation; (6) transfer of 
undocumented funds between corporations; and (7) allocation of unclear profits and losses 
between corporations.364  
A party bringing a veil-piercing claim bears the burden of showing that the corporation is 
in fact a “dummy or sham” for another person or entity. 365 In determining whether two 
corporations are truly separate, significant factors to consider include adequacy of capitalization, 
overlapping directorates and officers, separate record keeping, payment of taxes and filing of 
                                                 
358 Id. at 416 
359 Id.  
360 Id. at 417 (“the courts will disregard the corporate form, or, to use accepted terminology, ‘pierce the 
corporate veil,’ whenever necessary ‘to prevent fraud or to achieve equity.’”). 
361 See infra Part III. 
362 Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d at 420 (“a larger corporate entity composed of many corporations which, under 
general principles of agency, would be liable to each other’s creditors in contract and in tort.”); KLEIN, RAMSEYER, 
AND BRAINBRIGE, BUS. ASS’NS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 191 (7th 
ed. 2009).  
363 Indah v. U.S. S.E.C., 661 F.3d 914, 921 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. 
Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008); see also In re Silicon Gel Brest Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. 
Supp. 1447, 1452 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (stating that when a corporation is so controlled as to be the alter ego or mere 
instrumentality of its stockholders, the corporate form may be disregarded in the interests of justice).  
364 PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 173-74 (Tex. 2007) (describing a “single 
business enterprise” approach).  
365 See, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 378-79, 380 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (“dummy or sham” corporations); Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petrol., C.A., 907 F.2d 1012, 1021 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (refusing to “impute to the dominated corporation the forum contacts of its alter ego”); Fields v. Sedgwick 
Associated Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] parent corporation’s ties to a forum do not create 
personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary.”).  
 
 




consolidated returns, maintenance of separate bank accounts, level of parental financing and 
control over the subsidiary, and the subsidiary’s authority over day-to-day operations.366  
Although the Court in Goodyear touched upon it, the presence theory based on a piercing 
corporate veil is still uncertain because the State laws often interfere with the corporate veil theory, 
especially in the absence of any precedents.367 This is especially true because often the state courts 
follow local business laws, but theoretically an orb-web corporation can be present through 
piercing a corporate veil in an appropriate situation.368  
 
D. Presence: A Consent Theory (or a Waiver)  
 
The consent and waiver approaches of the presence model are “two sides of the same coin.” 
A consent approach generally applies as an alternative to a principal place of business and a state 
of incorporation. In an orb-web corporation case, all domestic and foreign subsidiaries of a parent 
(or an orb) are automatically consented to the United States’ jurisdiction. 369 
The concept of consent is a traditional basis of jurisdiction that predates the minimum 
contacts model that as set forth in International Shoe. A consent  arguably be upheld even in the 
absence of the minimum contacts.370 Traditionally, the states cannot compel a non-resident 
corporation to be adjudicated in the state court or to refrained from invoking the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.371 It is certainly fair to hold a party responsible to the court in which the party has 
deliberately and voluntarily engaged in a litigation-inducing behavior.372 Professor Miller stated 
“the concept of consent grows problematic when the law extends beyond its core of thoughtful and 
deliberate action.”373  
                                                 
366 See 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43, 194 (Cum. Supp. 1987); 
see also Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988) (indicating that the concept of complete 
domination by the parent is decisive); Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1459 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that courts 
have generally declined to find alter ego liability based on a parent corporation’s use of a cash management system); 
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 34 (D. Mass. 1987) (emphasizing that a 
centralized cash management system […] where the accounting records always reflect the indebtedness of one entity 
to another, is not the equivalent of intermingling funds); Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 
F. Supp. 831, 846 (D. Del. 1978) (stating that arrangements by a parent and subsidiary for economy of expense and 
convenience of administration may be made without establishing the relationship of principal and agent).  
367 See Lonnie S. Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U PA. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2004); 
see also Daniel G. Brown, Comment, Jurisdiction Over a Corporation on the Basis of the Contacts of an Affiliated 
Corporation: Do You Have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 595 (1992). 
368 “Appropriate situation” means with any intent to harass the parent corporation.  
369 See supra discussion Part II.A-C. 
370 See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.53, 108–95 (3d ed. 2009).  
371 Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).  
372 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (stating that a State court, as a condition of using its new motor 
vehicle highways, requires out of State motorists to file certificates consenting to the State’s jurisdiction). 
373 PROFESSOR MILLER, supra note 39, at 37.  
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Generally, consent is not required to occur within certain time limit. Under the traditional 
consent theory of jurisdiction, a party may consent to a court’s jurisdiction prior to the suit’s 
institution or at the time suit is brought or after suit has started.374 And having objected to the 
absence of in personam jurisdiction, a defendant may rescind the objection, i.e., consent to the 
forum court’s jurisdiction, at any stage of the proceedings.375 It is easy and understandable that an 
individual can consent to the jurisdiction.  However, in case of a corporation, how consent can be 
acquired?  
In the recent cases, the Court overlooked the consent approach of presence model.376 All 
cases decided after International Shoe, were under the minimum contacts model.  
 
1. Consent: A Corporation’s Voluntary Submission to a Forum State 
 
If a corporate subsidiary is doing business in a forum state, then the subsidiary, at least 
with respect to that business, has voluntarily submitted to that State’s jurisdiction.377 One of the 
oldest tenets of personal jurisdiction is that if a non-resident corporate defendant voluntary submits 
to the jurisdiction of a forum state, then the consent to the forum state is satisfied automatically.378 
A non-resident corporate defendant may manifest consent to a court’s in personam jurisdiction in 
any number of ways, from failure seasonably to interpose a jurisdictional defense, to express 
acquiescence in the prosecution of a cause in a given forum, or to submission implied from a 
conduct.379  
An equally well-established principle is that a state may exact from the nonresident, as a 
condition of performing some activity in the state, consent to personal jurisdiction.380 Similarly, 
when a corporation is “present” or incorporated in a forum state, voluntary consent automatically 
satisfies.381  
Consent not only applies to defendants but also applies to plaintiffs. Likewise, consent 
satisfies when a plaintiff voluntarily submits to the defendant’s state for jurisdiction. It is the price 
that the plaintiff must pay to the state for allowing him or her to litigate in its courts. There is 
nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating the plaintiff as being there for all purposes for which 
                                                 
374 Gen. Contracting & Trading C. v. Interpole, Inc., 940 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991). 
375 Id.  
376 See sources cited in supra notes 4-8. 
377 Cf. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929-30 (stating that a North Carolina subsidiary is not responsible for foreign 
subsidiaries’ tortious acts but that the parent can be challenged based on enterprise liability).  
378 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 47.  
379 See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939); Marcial Ucin, S.A. v. SS 
Galicia, 723 F.2d 994, 996 (1st Cir. 1983). 
380 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
381 See discussion supra Part II.A-C.  
 
 




justice to the defendant requires his presence 382 In certain situations, parties may agree in a 
contractual situation by consenting to jurisdiction of the forum by bringing a lawsuit in that 
forum.383 When a defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the court by appearance, consent is 
satisfied.384 Likewise, “implied consent is established when the defendant’s activities manifest an 
intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”385 The voluntariness prong ensures that the 
“defendant’s contacts” with the forum State are “not based on the unilateral actions of another 
party or a third person.”386  
One of the most solidly established ways of giving such consent is to designate an agent 
for service of process within the State.387 The principal may not expressly or impliedly require 
consent by an agent as a condition of authority, and the agent’s exercise of power within its scope 
of authority during the term for which it was given or within reasonable time will bind the 
principal.388  
In the case of parent-subsidiary relationship, a relevant question raises great practical 
significance such as in Goodyear that whether a parent or a subsidiary can consent through one 
another for tortious conduct by a parent or its other subsidiary.389 The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Goodyear provides the proposition that when a sister-subsidiary consents to a State court’s 
jurisdiction, the other sister-subsidiaries of the parent corporation are not construed to have 
consented to the forum State’s jurisdiction, but rather requires each subsidiary’s individual consent 
or similar understanding to that effect.390 In Goodyear, the Court stated that Goodyear’s North 
                                                 
382 Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938). 
383 See discussion infra Part II.D.3.  
384 Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982). 
385 Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514, 523 (6th Cir. 2011).  
386 SeeI e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Inves., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 716 (1996) (citing Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). 
387 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (f); see also Hans Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 
COLUM. L. REV. 1031, 1032-71 (1961) (describing the importance of procedural rule in domestic and international 
settings).  
388 See generally 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 274 (3d ed. 1959); Nat'l Equip. Rental, 
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964). In National Equipment, the plaintiff, a New York corporation, had 
leased equipment to the defendant, a Michigan farmer, under a form agreement that on its back appointed for the 
Michigan lessee farmer a New York resident to accept service of process. The plaintiff corporation sued the farmer in 
New York, and the farmer defaulted. The Court held that the parties’ appointment clause served as a consent to 
jurisdiction in the State of New York with which the farmer may not have the requisite minimum contacts under the 
appointment clause.  
389 PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 85, n.6.  
390 See Global Presence, GOODYEAR CORPORATE, http://www.goodyear.com/corporate/about/facilities.html 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2017) (showing that Goodyear tire and Rubber Corp. has world headquarters in Akron, OH. The 
corporation operates in five regions: (1) North America, (2) Europe, (3) Asia-Pacific, (4) Middle East, (5) Africa, and 
(6) Latin America. Goodyear USA is incorporated under the laws of New York and has plants in 21 locations in North 
America only. New York is also a principal place of business for Goodyear’s North America segments. In North 
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Carolina corporation did not object to the North Carolina State court’s assertion of jurisdiction.391 
Thus, Goodyear’s North Carolina Corporation consented or voluntarily submitted to the North 
Carolina State court’s jurisdiction.392 The Court found, however, that the same may not be true for 
subsidiaries Goodyear Turkey, Goodyear Luxemburg and Goodyear France.393 Although the 
defendant may raise a defense of consent or waiver,394 when a claim is related to a subsidiary’s 
action in tort, the doctrine of vicarious liability arises,395 and an orb-web parent can be liable 
without any exception.  
 
2. Consent: A Corporation’s Registration with a Forum State 
 
The registration theory raises various difficult questions yet to be answered. A number of 
State and federal courts follow the consent theory, based on a registration approach that has 
remained unsuccessful.396 Nevertheless, a corporation’s voluntary registration to do business in a 
State is an automatic consent to jurisdiction, and such consent is a part of a bargain by which the 
corporation agrees to accept certain obligations in return for the right to do business in the State.397 
In a very early case, Pennsylvania Fire Insurance, the Court established the proposition that a 
State may exercise general jurisdiction over any foreign corporation that registered to do business 
in that State, which satisfies due process, but the proposition raised the question of constitutionality 
after Pennoyer and International Shoe and its progeny.398 In Pennsylvania Fire Insurance, Justice 
Holmes articulated that the defendant corporation’s designation of the Missouri Commissioner of 
Insurance as corporation’s local agents. In International Shoe, the Court established that when a 
foreign corporation has not expressly consented to a State’s jurisdiction by registration, “minimum 
contacts” with that State can provide a due process basis for finding implied consent to the State’s 
                                                 
Carolina, Goodyear operates three plants, and it is incorporated there. In this context, the North Carolina plant is a 
sister-subsidiary of Goodyear, and not a parent corporation).  
391 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 916 (stating that “[i]n contrast to the parent company, Goodyear USA, which 
does not contest the North Carolina courts’ personal jurisdiction over it, petitioners are not registered to do business 
in North Carolina.”). 
392 See supra text and accompanying notes 369-83.  
393 See discussion supra Part I. 
394 See Jardines Bacata, Ltd. v. Diaz-Marquez, 878 F.2d 1555, 1559 (1st Cir. 1989).  
395Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that a claim against a principal for deliberate 
indifference based upon the master’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by its agent).  
396 See Agribusiness United DMCC v. Blue Water Shipping Comp., 2017 WL 1354144, No. H-16-2249, at 
*5 (S. D.Tex., 2017) (describing that although the defendant was registered to do Business in Texas, it did not have 
personal jurisdiction); Figueroa v. BNSF R. Comp., 390 P. 3d 1019,1020 (Or. 2017) (stating that appointment of 
registered agent does not mean that the corporation is consented to the jurisdiction) 
397 In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp 1265, 1278 (D. Md. 1981) (citing Neirbo Co. v. 
Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 175 (1939)). 
398 Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95 (1917); 
 
 




jurisdiction. 399 However, implied (or express) consent is automatically satisfied when the U.S. 
based orb-web corporation has established a world headquarters in the United States.400  
Can a court assert jurisdiction if a State has an interest in the litigation, and the litigation 
has casual connection with the forum State? The well-settled principle provides that when a 
corporation authorizes an agent to receive a service of process in compliance with the requirements 
of a State-registration statute, the corporation has consented in any action that is within the scope 
of the agent’s authority and subject to the jurisdiction of that forum State.401 When a defendant 
corporation applies for a certificate of authority and designates the Secretary of the State as its 
attorney for process, the defendant corporation has consented to be sued in a court in that forum 
State. 402 Consent is also satisfied when a defendant applies for and receives an authorization to 
do business in the forum State.403 
Nonetheless, the registration theory is still a very problematical because each time the 
courts have used different languages and illustrated various approaches of registration. For 
example, in Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., the Fourth Circuit Court held that the 
corporation’s registration is merely applying and qualifying to do business in the State, not actually 
doing business.404 However, in Knowlton v. Alied Vanlines, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court held that 
registration and appointment of an agent for a service of process was consent to jurisdiction, 
including consent to general jurisdiction, over an action unrelated to the forum State.405 In Wenche 
Siemer v. Lerjet Acquisition Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court held that the registration and an 
                                                 
399 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-18; Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 474-76; Perkins, 342 U.S. at 446. 
400 See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 130. 
401 Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., 739 F.2d 695, 697 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U.S. 165, 170-71, 174-75 (1939)).  
402 Dehne v. Hillman Inv. Co., 110 F.2d 456, 458 (3d Cir. 1940).  
403 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (describing that a defendant may also forfeit its objections to personal 
jurisdiction by failing to raise them timely in the answer or in an initial motion). 
404 Ratiff v. Cooper Labos., Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971). (In this 
case two drug manufacturing companies, Cooper Laboratories, Inc. and Sterling Drug Company, challenged the 
jurisdiction of the District Court of South Carolina brought by nonresidents for the case of action arising outside the 
State. The case involved diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff was injured from the consumption of drugs manufactured 
by the defendants. The drugs at issue were neither manufactured nor consumed in South Carolina. Additionally, one 
of the plaintiffs was a resident of Florida and the other plaintiff was a resident of Indiana.  
Defendant Cooper Laboratories was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mystic, 
Connecticut. The corporation’s activities in South Carolina were limited to solicitation by mail to dealers and 
wholesalers, and the mailing of promotional literature to approximately 650 doctors on its mailing lists. Another 
defendant, Sterling Drug, a Delaware corporation, maintained its principal place of business in New York where it 
manufactured the drug taken by plaintiff Nichols. Sterling Drug filed an application and was given authority to do 
business in South Carolina and appointed an agent for service of process. Additionally, Sterling maintained five “detail 
men” who lived in South Carolina and promoted Sterling’s products through personal contacts with doctors and 
drugstores throughout the State. The plaintiffs filed a claim in South Carolina because of the State’s relatively long 
statute of limitations.) 
405 Knowlton v. Allied Vanlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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appointment of an agent does not constitute consent to jurisdiction, and it is unconstitutional.406 In 
addition, the court said that an exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation is 
constitutionally permissible only when the foreign corporation’s continuous and systematic 
contacts create a “general business presence” in the forum State…[,] “being qualified to do 
business...‘is of no special weight’ in evaluating general personal jurisdiction[,]” and “a foreign 
corporation that properly complies with the Texas registration statute only consents to personal 
jurisdiction where such jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible.407  
Inconsistent and different decisions by federal courts suggest that the courts are not firm 
on the principle of registration.  
 
3. Consent: A Contractual Relationship by a Forum Selection Clause   
 
Parties to a contract may consent to litigate disputes in a particular forum by inserting a 
forum selection clause into their contract.408 Courts must give effect to . . . freely negotiated forum 
selection clauses.409 If so, the only relevant inquiry for the courts is whether the forum selection 
clause is enforceable unless fraud, duress, or other coercive factors are present, which may 
preclude the consenting corporations from contesting on personal jurisdiction, unless they can 
clearly show that an enforcement of the clause was unreasonable.410 Generally, a forum selection 
clause “designates that all disputes arising out of a contract must be litigated in the courts of a 
specific State. Not all forum selection clauses designate an exclusive forum. Many simply State 
that the parties consent to be sued in the courts of the specific State.”411  
                                                 
406 Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 181(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
1080 (1993).  
407 Id. at 183. 
408 Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315 (1964) (showing that this is the first leading 
Supreme Court case in which advance consent was upheld. In this case, Michigan farmers signed an equipment lease 
that allowed the New York lessor to litigate disputes arising out of the lease agreement in New York. The Supreme 
Court held that the clause was sufficient basis for jurisdiction; likewise, whether a party can limit the forum choice by 
contact was also addressed in this case); Williams v. Life Savs. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 1986).  
409 See Elec. Realty Assocs., L.P. v. Vaughan Real EState, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 521, 523 (D. Kan. 1995); see 
also KKW Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 1999).  
410 Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972). In this case the defendant, a German 
corporation, agreed to tow a drilling rig off Zapata, an American corporation from LA, to a point off Ravenna, Italy. 
The contract provided that any dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice. The Court held that  
selection of a London forum was clearly a reasonable effort to bring vital certainty to this 
international transaction and to provide a neutral forum experienced and capable in the resolution 
of litigation. Whatever “inconvenience” Zapata would suffer by being forced to litigate in the 
contractual forum as it agreed to do was clearly foreseeable at the time of contracting. In such 
circumstances, it should be incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial 
in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical 
purposes be deprived of his day in court. Absent that, there is no basis for concluding that it would 
be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain. 
411 Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart 
 
 




As a general proposition, a defendant can consent to personal jurisdiction by entering into 
a contract containing a valid forum selection clause.412 With respect to jurisdictional analysis, a 
corporation may be involved in a tortious act but may not be involved in any contractual 
relationship with the other party or a forum State. In the United States, the jurisdictional law on 
contract and tort claims functions differently.413 Nevertheless, in International Shoe, the Court 
stretched the point, in dicta, that a corporation’s tortious act might impose obligation or liability, 
but due process might satisfy in such a tortious cause of action if nature, quality, and circumstances 
of the cause of action warrant.414 Another example case is World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, a product liability case, which involved no contractual relation with the forum State. 
The Court recognized that besides the contract and tort cause of action in deciding jurisdiction, 
there are other factors to be considered such as reasonableness and fairness to the defendant.415 In 
Calder v. Jones, the Court applied the effect test and held that California had jurisdiction over 
individual defendants for their tortious act because their action was intentional and expressly aimed 
at the forum State; therefore, jurisdiction is proper in California based on effects of the Florida 
defendant’s conduct in California.416  
The effect test established in Calder is similar to that of Brussel I regulation, which is quite 
clear that a single tort will support jurisdiction.417 Under the Brussel I regulation, the State with 
jurisdiction over the principal defendant also has a jurisdiction over a third-party defendant for the 
purposes of claims for contribution or liability, and in such case no affiliation or third-party 
defendant need to be shown. In contrast, in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de 
Honduras,418 the Court was concerned that foreign retaliation issues might raise in extraterritorial 
                                                 
and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 380 (1993).  
412 See, e.g., Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 726 (8th Cir. 2001).  
413 See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 655-76 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that under tort claims the 
plaintiff may claim for wrongful death, product liability, intentional tort etc.); see PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 80-
81 (13th ed. 2009); see also Thomas A. Rossi, Lender Liability in Kansas: A Paradigm of Competing Tort and 
Contract Theories, 29 WASHBURN L.J., 495, 516-17 (1990).  
414 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (citing Rosenberg Bros. Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923) (stating 
that jurisdiction would not be upheld on out of State dealer whose only connection with the forum State was only to 
purchase of merchandise, which were made sometimes by visiting salesman or by mail under the Motor Vehicle Act)). 
415 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (internal citation omitted).  
416 Calder v. Johns, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  
417 COUNCIL REG. 44/2001 22 DEC. 2000 on PETER JURISDICTION & RECOGNITION & ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS IN CIV. & COM. MATTERS, 
http://www.columbia.edu/~mr2651/ecommerce3/2nd/statutes/BrusselsRegulation.pdf; see PETER HAY, supra note 10, 
at 1062, 1066-67 (showing that a regulation has a general application and binding entirely and directly to its member 
States. This regulation has the same function as a federal statue in the United States. Article 5(3) of Regulation I states 
that matters relating to tort, delict or quasi delict, will be litigated in courts of the place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur. Under Article 5(3) of the Regulation, in the European Union, there is specific jurisdiction at 
the place where the tort action is occurred.).  
418 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
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cases if the US law were to be imposed. 419 However, the subsidiaries of a U.S. parent corporation 
have already consented to jurisdiction of the United States courts by accepting the parent 
corporation’s world headquarters, and thus, dual citizenship of the subsidiaries is satisfied.  
However, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,420 the plaintiff was an American company 
incorporated in Delaware with its principal office in Illinois. The company manufactured and 
distributed toiletries and hair products in the United States and abroad.421 The plaintiff expanded 
its overseas operations in Germany under the ownership of a German entity.422 Pursuant to their 
contract agreement, the German entity transferred its ownership along with all rights and 
trademarks to the plaintiff.423 Their contract also contained a number of express warranties and 
choice-of-law provisions and that “[t]he laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and 
govern their agreement, its interpretation and performance.”424 Later, the plaintiff discovered that 
the trademark rights it purchased under the contract were subject to substantial encumbrances that 
threatened to give others superior rights and restrict or preclude the plaintiff’s use of them.425 The 
plaintiff commenced an action against the German entity.426 In deciding personal jurisdiction, the 
Court found that “[t]wo policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case.”427 One is the 
choice of law provision and the Securities Act of 1933 both were ‘[d]esigned to protect investors 
and to require “issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the character 
of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent fraud in their sale by creating 
a special right to recover for misrepresentation.”428 These types of challenges draw the attention 
of practitioners to look beyond the facts of the case because a contract between a parent and 
subsidiary often carries special contractual terms, including indemnification.  
 
E.  Importance of an Adequate Notice to Subsidiaries Located Outside the United States: 
 The Hague Convention 
 
Service of process outside the forum was not allowed in Pennoyer. Later, in International 
Shoe, the Court allowed a service of process outside the State’s border. Later still, Congress 
                                                 
419 See id. at 21 (recognizing that vast application of U.S. law in a foreign setting could invite retaliatory 
response from other nations).  
420 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).  
421 Id. at 508.  
422 Id.  
423 Id. 
424 Id.  










allowed under the Hague Convention service of process outside the United States’ border by 
signing a multilateral treaty that provided a simpler way to serve a process abroad, ensured 
defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions (in the United States) would receive actual and timely 
notice of suit, and facilitated proof of service abroad.429 When a domestic corporation is not a 
subsidiary of the foreign-born orb corporation, then service on the domestic corporation does not 
effectuate proper service on the foreign company (or the orb corporation) if the companies do not 
own corporate stock of each other, and do not share expenses profits, losses, office facilities, 
bookkeeping, equipment or other property.430 When a corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary 
maintain separate corporate identities, “though perhaps merely formal,” service on the subsidiary 
is not a valid service on its parent, despite the identity of interests between the parent and its 
subsidiary and despite control by the parent over the subsidiary’s operations.431  
The Convention applies to choice of court agreements “concluded in civil or commercial 
matters.”432 The Convention excludes consumer and employment contracts and certain specified 
subject matters.433 The reasons for these exclusions are, in most cases, the existence of more 
specific international instruments, and national, regional, or international rules that claim exclusive 
jurisdiction for some of these matters.434 An agreement designating one or more specific courts in 
a contracting State is deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided 
otherwise.435 In addition, a contracting state may declare that it will recognize and enforce 
judgments given by courts designated in a non-exclusive choice of court agreement.436 
Under the Hague Convention, “[s]ervice of process refers to a formal delivery of 
documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action,” as 
determined by the otherwise applicable State rules governing the method of service.437 In case of 
service of process for a foreign corporation, the Hague Convention is applicable, and its provisions 
preempt inconsistent methods of service prescribed by State law.438 Thus, when one of the parties 
                                                 
429 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 698. 
430 Rhodes v. J.P. Sauer & Sohn, Inc., 98, F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (W.D. La. 2000).  
431 Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1925).  
432 See Convention on the Choice of Court, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., Nov. 25, 1965, 220 U.N.T.S. 





437 Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700.  
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is a foreign defendant (or a foreign plaintiff), service of process must comport with the Hague 
Convention.439 
In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa (“Aerospatiale”),440 the Court suggested that the discovery rules set forth 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention are the law of the United 
States.441 The Court explained that if the Hague Convention is used as the exclusive means for 
obtaining evidence located abroad, then every American court hearing a case involving a 
contracting State must follow the internal laws of that State.442  
Since both The Hague Convention and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are authorized by 
the federal statues, comity and federalism concern may not apply when requesting a document 
from the foreign signatory states because these states have arguably consented by signing the treaty 
with the United States.443 Hence, for example, in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.,444 
the Court said that a 
 
[t]reaty is in the nature of a contract between nations. Under the doctrine of “rebus 
sic stantibus,” a nation which is party to a treaty might conceivably invoke changed 
circumstances as an excuse for terminating its obligations under the treaty. But 
when the parties to a treaty continue to assert its vitality a private person who finds 
the continued existence of the treaty inconvenient may not invoke the doctrine on 
their behalf.445 
  
Our Constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of the land.446 For example, in 
Bacardi Corporation of America v. Deomnech,447 the Court held that “every mark duly registered 
or legally protected in one of the contracting States shall be admitted to registration or deposit and 
legally protected in the other contracting States, upon compliance with the formal provisions of 
                                                 
439 See id. at 706-07 (stating that Hague Service Convention does not apply when process is served on a 
foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary which, under State law, is a foreign corporation’s involuntary 
agent for service). 
440 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States S.D. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
441 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533. 
442 See id. at 534 (“The text of the Evidence Convention itself does not modify the law of any contracting 
State, require any contracting State to use the Convention procedures, either in requesting evidence or in responding 
to such requests, or compel any contracting State to change its own evidence-gathering procedures.”). 
443 Id. 
444 Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).  
445 Id. at 253 (internal citation omitted). 
446 U.S. CONST. art VI.  
447 Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 
 




the domestic law of such States.”448 Bacardi Corporation of America, a Pennsylvania corporation, 
authorized and entitled to manufacture and sell rum in Puerto Rico under the trademark and label 
of Compania Ron Bacardi, S.A., a Cuban corporation.449 The parties maintained their contractual 
terms for more than 20 years.450 Despite the prohibition in Cuba, the defendant sold rum in Puerto 
Rico and throughout the United States under the trademark, which included the word “Bacardi” or 
“Bacardi y Cia.”451 The trademark was duly registered in the United States Patent Office and in 
the Office of the Executive Secretary of Puerto Rico.452 The Court held that when a treaty becomes 
law through ratification, then no special legislation is necessary to make it effective. 453  
Accordingly, when filing a case against such foreign corporation, practitioners must 
determine whether there are treaties or international agreements. However, U.S. procedural laws 
do not allow the discovery until a case is filed in a court.454 Extensive discovery could be a viable 
option, but it is not a right option due to costs involved in the discovery process.455 Even though a 
parent and subsidiaries are separate entities, they are nevertheless bound by anticompetitive 
conduct clauses and to redress anticompetitive harm through indemnification. Under these sets of 
considerations, a U.S.-born orb-web corporation should be treated as one web under the presence 
model.  
 
III. GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER U.S. SUBSIDIARIES OF FOREIGN-BORN, ORB-WEB  
 CORPORATIONS 
A. Introduction of Current Law 
 
It would be unwise to assume jurisdiction over a foreign-born orb-web corporation without 
first analyzing the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says 
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
                                                 
448 Id. at 158-59. 
449 Id. at 153. 
450 Id. 
451 Id.  
452 Id.  
453 Id. at 161. 
454 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
455 SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., AMERICAN CASEBOOK SERIES: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE 458-72 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter SCHEINDLIN]. 
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.456  
Arguably, when a corporation is not a citizen of the United States, the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot be asserted on an orb-web corporation’s parent.457 Under the equality notion, 
one nation cannot impose its rule on others even though the imposing nation has a right to do so.458 
A foreign-born orb-web corporation operates its businesses in the United States in three different 
ways: (a) by incorporating a subsidiary in the United States,459 (b) by establishing an agency in the 
United States,460 or (c) by establishing a shell corporation in the United States.461 Often these 
subsidiaries have some sort of contract with the host nation.462 
If an orb-web corporation is not born in the United States, but operates its business in the 
United States through its subsidiary incorporated in the United States, then the state courts can 
establish general jurisdiction under the presence model over the subsidiary only as an independent 
domestic corporation.463 The crux of the relationship requires a determination as to whether due 
process is satisfied. In Bank of Augusta v. Earle,464 the Court said:  
 
The question is not on the powers of a corporation, but as to whom and to what 
objects those powers can be exerted. A corporation is the creature of the law, and 
it is clothed with all the powers of a person. The position, on the other side, is that 
when it leaves the State, which gave it existence by granting its charter, it loses its 
personal existence, and has no existence whatever. This is a harsh doctrine, and 
seems at war with the principles of those who assert and maintain State rights.465  
 
Although it is true that a corporation is a person, citizenship of a corporation is different 
from a citizenship of an individual. Once an individual moves out of a State with intent to reside 
in some other State, then the new place where the individual intends to reside qualifies as a new 
                                                 
456 U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
457 See id. 
458 The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 122 (1825).  
459 See infra Part III.C. 
460 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 U.S. 754 (2014); See infra Part III.D.  
461 See infra Part III.E. 
462 See supra diagram I 
463 See discussion supra Part II. 
464 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839). 
465 Id. at 524.  
 
 




domicile of that individual.466 However, in the case of a corporation, citizenship is granted where 
the corporation is born and one other place where the corporation runs its business.467  
However, the problem for practitioners is determining whether the corporation is an orb-
web corporation and whether the orb-web corporation is born in the United States (or abroad). For 
example, in Goodyear, the plaintiff did not raise a corporate disclosure, which showed that any 
subsidiary that owned more than 10% of a parent company must be alleged and disclosed to claim 
enterprise liability.468 Perhaps, a simple company portfolio would have revealed where the 
Goodyear subsidiaries were positioned Goodyear’s corporate web. 
 
B. A Plaintiff’s Responsibility of Simple Discovery 
 
As a practical matter, discovering who or what is central to the sources of controversy that 
must be identified. For example, for an orb-web corporation born in the United States, it would be 
comparatively easy for practitioners to determine who is the parent and who is the subsidiary. 
However, when only a subsidiary corporation of a foreign parent is present in the United States, 
this analysis becomes very complex, if a plaintiff decides to sue a foreign parent (orb) corporation. 
Therefore, practitioners must identify, as the first step of litigation, corporate name, State or States 
of incorporation, dates of incorporation, names and principal places of business, States where the 
corporation is licensed to transact business, charter number, issuance date, and whether a license 
to transact business was ever expired or revoked.469  
Practitioners should also attempt to gather each date upon which a present or former officer, 
agent, or employee of the corporation has been physically present in the state in past years; the 
corporation’s mailing address;470 and any corporate products, goods or services performed, 
manufactured, processed, or sold by the corporation; general descriptions of products sold and 
these transactions’ volume.471 In addition, general web-search may reveal a great deal of publicly 
available information, such as revenue generated by the corporation and its subsidiaries as one 
unit, the name of the parent and all affiliated subsidiaries, and goods and products sold in the 
territory, state, country, or continent.472  
Orb-web-corporations are extremely complex and most cases were lost in this process of 
identifying the true corporate structure. For example, in Lots Co. Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision 
                                                 
466 Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399, cert denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974) (stating that “[a] person’s domicile 
is the place of ‘his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of 
returning whenever he is absent therefrom”). 
467 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. However, this rule applies only to non-orb-web corporations. 
468 See supra text and accompanying notes 340-41. 
469 See JOHN HARDIN YOUNG ET AL., WRITTEN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY THEORY & PRACTICE at 320-21 (5th 
ed. 2009) [hereinafter HARDIN YOUNG].  
470 See id. at 321.  
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Industry Co.,473 the plaintiff was a Taiwanese electronics manufacturing company474 that 
specialized in designing and manufacturing USB connectors for notebook computers in China.475 
Plaintiff generally sold its USB connectors to Chinese companies (“ODMs”), which then made 
and assembled computer products, incorporating USB connectors for many well-known computer 
brands, such as Acer, Dell, HP, and Apple.476 Those name-brand computer products, in turn, made 
their way into the hands of consumers and businesses around the world, including the United 
States.477 The evidence was presented to the court that roughly 94% of global notebook computers 
were assembled by ODMs.478 The federal district court found that the relationship among the 
“defendants”479 was not clear.  
Defendant Hon Hai is an orb-web corporation founded in 1974 by Hon Hai Precision 
Industry Company Ltd., anchor company of Hon Hai / Foxconn Technology Group. Hon Hai 
devoted itself to integrating expertise in mechanical and electrical parts and an uncommon concept 
to provide the lowest “total cost” solution to increase the affordability of electronics products for 
all mankind.480 The corporation also claims that  
 
Today, Hon Hai / Foxconn Technology Group is the most dependable partner for 
joint-design, joint-development, manufacturing, assembly and after-sales services 
to global Computer, Communication and Consumer-electronics (“3C”) leaders. 
Aided by its legendary green manufacturing execution, uncompromising customer 
                                                 
473 Lotes Co. Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 399-400 (2nd Cir. 2014). 




478 Id.  
479 Lotes Co. Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 399 (2nd Cir. 2014). The court said that 
The defendants are a group of companies that compete with Lotes in making and selling 
USB connectors. They also are involved in making, assembling, and distributing electronic 
components and devices that incorporate USB connectors. Defendant–Appellee Hon Hai 
Precision Industry Co., Ltd. (“Hon Hai”) is a Taiwanese corporation that is one of the 
world’s largest manufacturers of electronic components, including USB connectors. 
Defendant–Appellee Foxconn International Holdings, Ltd. is a Cayman Islands 
corporation specializing in the design and manufacture of components for consumer 
electronics products, and is one of the largest exporters from China. Defendant–Appellee 
Foxconn International, Inc. is a California corporation that receives products from other 
Foxconn companies for distribution within the United States. Defendant–Appellee 
Foxconn Electronics, Inc. is another California corporation that designs and manufactures 
components for consumer electronics. Defendant Foxconn (Kunshan) Computer 
Connector Co., Ltd. (“Foxconn Kunshan”) is a Chinese ODM.  








devotion and its award-winning proprietary business model, eCMMS, Hon Hai has 
been the most trusted name in contract manufacturing services (including CEM, 
EMS, ODM and CMMS) in the world.481 
 
As an orb-web corporation, Hon Hai expanded its business within a very short time and 
currently possesses a net capital of $147,934,068,630.482 The plaintiff brought an action against 
these defendants alleging that they competed with the patent to control and gain monopoly over 
USB connectors, in violation of the Sherman Act and State law.483 Given this case’s particular 
facts, how should the courts determine the jurisdiction under the existing minimum contacts 
model?  
As noted, one of the defendants was from the U.S. and subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States.484 It may also have been likely that the U.S. defendant was a subsidiary 
of Hon Hai/Foxconn.485 The court noted the difficulties of identifying the corporate relationship 
between the defendants because the lower courts do not have guidance to determine such cases 
and individual plaintiffs are unable to set forth a prima facie case by showing a corporate 
governance of such a foreign-born, orb-web corporation.486  
The preliminary search may provide the information about which corporation is a parent 
of an orb-web corporation and which corporations are its subsidiaries. This may enable the 
practitioners to identify whom to sue: a parent, subsidiaries, or an agent. Although web information 
may not provide a plaintiff an authority, it would certainly help.  
 
C. A Foreign-born, Orb-Web Corporation’s Incorporated Subsidiaries in the United  
 States 
 
These types of corporations are web corporations, either vertically or horizontally, attached 
with a parent (orb) corporation and provide necessary resources to the orb. Although they are part 
of the same web construction, a parent is not born in the United States (but born abroad), so it will 
not be fair to call up the parent for its subsidiary’s fault in tort or personal injury cause of actions 
in the United States unless some other lawful means are available.487  
                                                 
481 Id.  
482 See id. (stating that it ranked among 32 companies). 
483 See id. 
484 See id.  
485 See id. 
486 Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F. 3d at 399.  
487 Cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (citing Sosa v. Alverez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (“The Court therefore held that “federal courts should not recognize private claims under 
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among 
civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.”).). 
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At least two precedent cases, Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. Los Angeles488 and Bauman, offer 
that the state courts cannot preclude a U.S. plaintiff from adjudicating a claim against a subsidiary 
of a foreign-born, orb-web parent.489 By fair means, such a foreign-born parent corporation may 
be burdened by the laws of the country in which it was born--in the same way as a U.S. born orb-
web corporation is bound by the United States laws.490  
For example, in Japan Line, Ltd., the Court said that “more elaborate inquiry” is needed 
when a State seeks to tax foreign instrumentalities rather than domestic businesses engaged in 
interstate commerce.491 The Court set two-part inquiries:  
 
first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of 
international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal 
Government from “speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations 
with foreign governments.” If a State tax contravenes either of these precepts, it is 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.492  
 
The Court reasoned that in former, the goal is to avoid multiple taxation of the 
instrumentalities of foreign commerce, and in the latter, signing a convention to reflect a national 
policy to remove impediments as “instruments of international traffic.”493 However, Congress has 
adopted flexibility and allowed States to regulate “matters of local state concern, even though in 
some measure it affects commerce, provided it does not materially restrict the free flow of 
commerce across state lines, or interfere with it in matters with respect to which uniformity of 
regulation is of predominant national concern.”494 In addition, the interpretation of the Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation Treaty is generally controlling unless it provides a result that is 
inconsistent with an intent or expectation of its signatories.495  
 In Bauman, on the other hand, the plaintiffs argued that Daimler could be sued based on 
its agency relationship or a subsidiary relationship with MBUSA.496 California’s long-arm statute 
allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction “to the full extent permissible under the United States 
                                                 
488 Japan Line, Ltd. v. L.A. Cnty., 441 U.S. 434, 452-53 (1979). 
489 See infra Parts III.D, E. 
490 Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 U.S. 637, 642 (1976) (“We are unable to say that the treatment of 
foreign corporations affected by Exception 27 constitutes discrimination repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause. 
The gist of appellant’s argument is that, because Exception 27 does not require that plaintiff demonstrate the existence 
of his cause of action, there was ‘[d]enied to appellant...a virtually unique opportunity afforded to domestic 
corporations, to preview its adversary’s case in chief except as to the extent of damages’”). 
491 Id. at 451. 
492 Id. 
493 Id. at 452-53 (citation omitted).  
494 Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 434. 
495 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (citation omitted).  
496 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
 
 




Constitution.”497 Daimler argued that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its 
parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego.498 Upholding the 
minimum contacts model, the Court held that Daimler was not “at home” 499 and could not be sued 
for injuries in California.500 The Court said that it had not yet addressed whether a foreign 
corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-State 
subsidiary.501 
The Court reasoned that neither Daimler nor MBUSA was incorporated in California, nor 
did either entity have its principal place of business there.502 If Daimler’s California activities 
sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global reach 
would presumably be available in every other State in which MBUSA had sizable sales.503 Such 
exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-State defendants “to 
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and 
will not render them liable to suit.504 
However, in doing so, the Court did not consider the risk of loss shifting from orb-web 
corporations to the individuals harmed by their actions even though the orb-web corporation had 
a massive presence in multiple States and in multiple countries.505 Justice Sotomayor was 
concerned that a U.S. business might enter into a contract with a foreign country to sell its products, 
but may not be able to seek relief in any U.S. court if the multinational company breaches the 
contract, even if that company has considerable operations in numerous U.S. forums.506 
Nevertheless, it precludes a plaintiff, in these examples, from seeking legal recourse anywhere in 
the United States even if no other judicial system is available to provide relief.507 Justice 
Sotomayor also made a wonderful comment concerning “the change in the navigation of the time” 
that  
 
The proportionality approach will treat small businesses unfairly in comparison to 
national and multinational conglomerates. Whereas a larger company will often be 
                                                 
497 Id. 
498 Id. 
499 Id.  
500 Id. 
501 Id. at 759. 
502 Id. at 761. 
503 Id. 
504 Id. at 762 (internal citation omitted).  
505 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).  
506 Id.  
507 Id.  
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immunized from general jurisdiction in a State on account of its extensive contacts 
outside the forum, a small business will not be. For instance, the majority holds 
today that Daimler is not subject to general jurisdiction in California despite its 
multiple offices, continuous operations, and billions of dollars’ worth of sales there. 
But imagine a small business that manufactures luxury vehicles principally 
targeting the California market and that has substantially all of its sales and 
operations in the State—even though those sales and operations may amount to 
one-thousandth of Daimler’s. Under the majority’s rule, that small business will be 
subject to suit in California on any cause of action involving any of its activities 
anywhere in the world, while its far more pervasive competitor, Daimler, will not 
be. That will be so even if the small business incorporates and sets up its 
headquarters elsewhere (as Daimler does), since the small business’ California 
sales and operations would still predominate when “apprais[ed]” in proportion to 
its minimal “nationwide and worldwide” operations. 508 
 
Ironically, Daimler AG claims that special items affect its earnings before interests and 
taxes, including (a) restricting its own dealer network; (b) relocation of MBUSA’s headquarters; 
(c) sales of real estate in the United States.509 Daimler AG also says that out of 460 units (in 
thousands of cars) sold in 2015, only 65 units (in thousands) were sold in Germany while 88 units 
sold in the United States.510 Daimler Financial Services provide 108.9 billion euros worth of 
revenue, out of which the United States and Latin America contributed 48.5 billion euros.511  
Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), headquartered in Montvale, New Jersey, is responsible 
for the distribution, marketing, and customer service for all Mercedes-Benz products in the United 
States.512 Daimler made a public statement that its individual business unit set yet another record 
in the second quarter and sold more than 500,000 passenger cars, 20% more than the last quarter.513 
In the year 2015, it sold more than 960,000 vehicles, 19% increase over the same period last 
year.514 Daimler claimed that due to relocation of MBUSA headquarters, Daimler lost 20 million 
euros.515  
28 U.S.C. § 1350 provides that the district court shall have an original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of any civil nations or treaty of the 
                                                 
508 Id. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).  
509 Daimler, Corporate Presentation (Spring 2015),  https://www.daimler.com/dokumente/ investoren/ 
praesentationen/daimler-ir-corporatepresentation-spring-2015.pdf .  
510 Id. at 58. 
511 Id. at 71.  
512 See id.  
513 See id.  
514 Id.  
515 Id. at 54. 
 
 




United States taken by an alien.516 Nevertheless, the Court stated that Daimler AG and MBUSA 
had an independent contractor agreement under which the parties agreed that MBUSA would not 
be liable against any claim against Daimler AG because MBUSA was not an agent of Daimler 
under their contract and thus no agency relationship was established.517 The Court’s decision is 
incorrect for several reasons.518 First, there should be no exception under this fact alone that 
jurisdiction depends upon the state of things when the action is brought.519 Second, the Court has 
recognized the citizenship of general and limited partners when determining the citizenship of 
parties.520 Third, Daimler AG has established the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility 
stating that  
 
Such a culture enables us to provide our employees with adequate compensation in 
line with the concept of equal treatment. We ensure their health and occupational 
safety, support their professional advancement, and safeguard their basic rights on 
the job. We strive to create working conditions that promote a work-life balance. 
To these ends, we work together with employee representatives in a spirit of trust, 
abiding by the Principles of Social Responsibility that Daimler has agreed upon 
together with employee representatives throughout the Group.521 
 
Fourth, this case provided substantial reasons to assert jurisdiction over the subsidiary of 
the foreign-born, orb-web corporation under the presence model522 because the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause allows jurisdiction over a corporate subsidiary who is residing (permanently) in the 
United States.523 Although the Fourteenth Amendment and Full Faith and Credit Clause would not 
be applicable to the foreign parent (orb) corporation, these constitutional provisions enacted in 
consideration to provide the protection to the United States citizens and its permanent residents.524 
Therefore, the Court should recognize the State courts’ jurisdiction over a subsidiary of a foreign-
born, orb-web corporation in future cases.  
 
D. A Foreign-Born, Orb-Web Corporation’s Operations through an Agent 
 
                                                 
516 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
517 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760, n.15.  
518 See infra text and accompanying notes 518-23.  
519 Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004) (Scalia, J.) 
520 See supra Parts I, II. 
521 Corporate Governance: Integrity Code, DAIMLER, 
https://www.daimler.com/documents/sustainability/integrity/daimler-integritycode.pdf (on file with the author). 
522 See supra Part II. 
523 See supra Part I. 
524 See id. 
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A foreign orb-web corporation’s relationship with its U.S. agency can be contractual in 
nature. If a foreign corporation appoints an agent in the United States for a service of process, then 
the agent is under contract with the foreign corporation to confer jurisdiction.525 However, a proper 
service upon the agent, under a valid State statute, constitutes consent to be sued in the federal 
courts.526 Congress had provided the federal courts concurrent jurisdiction with all fifty States.527 
Hence, this approach provides another avenue to determine jurisdiction.  
 
E. A Foreign-Born, Orb-web Corporation’s Operations by Establishing a Shell  
 Corporation (or a Subsidiary) in the United States 
 
A foreign-born, orb-web corporation’s operations through a shell subsidiary or fictitious 
entity is often to create an illusion of a legitimate look to carry the parent corporation’s business 
objectives.528 The question of whether a corporation is a shell subsidiary is a fact-intensive inquiry 
and requires extensive discovery. For example, in United States v. Daimler AG,529 the Justice 
Department (DOJ) claimed that Daimler AG, formerly Daimler Chrysler AG and Daimler Benz 
AG (“Daimler”), sold vehicles all over the world including to government and other State-owned 
entities. Individual and institutional investors owned Daimler.530 In doing so, Daimler became an 
issuer under the United States law, traded stocks in the New York Stock Exchange, and circulated 
more than one billion shares.531 The revenue received in these transactions was wired to U.S. bank 
accounts or foreign bank accounts.532 Daimler incorporated a shell company in the United States 
to enter other stock exchanges.533 The Federal District agreed with the DOJ and granted a little 
over 93 million dollars in criminal penalty payable immediately to DOJ.534  
                                                 
525 Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939). 
526 Id. at 170. 
527 See YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 177; but see BNSF R. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1557 (“[t]he phrase ‘concurrent 
jurisdiction’ is a well-known term of art long employed by Congress and courts to refer to subject-matter jurisdiction, 
not personal jurisdiction”).  
528 See supra text and accompanying notes 458-61. 
529 Compl. at 1, United States v. Daimler AG, No. 10-cr-063, (D.D.C. March 22, 2010), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/united-States-v-daimler-ag-court-docket-number-10-cr-063-rjl. 
530 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. Pub. Affs., Daimler and Three Subsidiaries Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $ 93.6 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sep. 15, 2014), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/daimler-ag-and-three-subsidiaries-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-
investigation-and. 
531 Id.  
532 Id.  
533 Id. 
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In Holland v. United States,535 the Court said that such shell corporations provide an 
inference of willfulness by establishing a consistent pattern of underreporting large amounts of 
income.536 A corporation’s intent plays a major role in creating shell entities to conceal certain 
unlawful acts or increase its net revenue.537 Therefore, asserting jurisdiction over such subsidiaries 
do not offend the traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice. 
Hence, these subsidiaries should be treated as a domestic corporation and should follow 
the same jurisdictional analysis as a domestic corporation in the United States as discussed in Parts 
I-III.   
 
IV. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ENGAGED IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE   
A. Analysis under the Current Regime 
 
Asserting jurisdiction in the State courts, in the stream-of-commerce cases, is notoriously 
challenging compared to asserting jurisdiction over orb-web corporations. Because tort, contract, 
and product liability are State substantive laws, and a State is obligated in protecting its citizens 
from defective products that brings harm to its citizens.538 In McIntyre, the Court explained that in 
a typical stream of commerce case, a nonresident defendant acting outside the forum places a 
product in the stream of commerce that ultimately causes harm inside a forum.539 However, stream 
of commerce cases are much different from what the Court has articulated in the past.  
Initially, the Court identified stream of commerce issues540 and introduced them to the 
lower courts as the stream of commerce model, by using an existing minimum contacts model to 
assert jurisdiction.541 Following the Court’s identification of this new model, the lower courts 
started to use it in their analysis as they were all bound by the Court’s precedents.542 However, the 
Court’s language in subsequent cases indicates that the minimum contacts model never meant to 
                                                 
535 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954). 
536 Id. at 139. 
537 United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d 199, 201 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The primary concern...is to penalize 
defendants who take advantage if a position that provides them freedom to commit or conceal a difficult-to-detect 
wrong”).  
538 See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 75 (2010) (describing that “A State also has a 
paramount interest in ensuring a forum for its injured citizens who have suffered catastrophic injuries due to allegedly 
defective products in the workplace, whether those products are toys that endanger children, tainted pharmaceutical 
drugs that harm patients, or workplace machinery that causes disabling injuries to employees”), rev’d sub nom. J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).  
539 Nicastro, supra note 537, at 54; see also Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 
REV. LITIG. 239, 262-268 (1998) (explaining the origin of stream of commerce theory).  
540 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286; Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 102. 
541 See generally McIntyre, 56. at 873-87.  
542 See cases cited supra notes 4-8.  
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accommodate the stream of commerce analysis.543 Thus, the Court’s language clearly raises the 
concern that the minimum contacts model, once again, failed to provide successful resolution of 
the structural ambiguity in personal jurisdiction. Hence, the minimum contacts analysis should be 
abrogated, along with the distinction between the specific and general jurisdiction, in stream of 
commerce cases.  
Instead, there are two types of transactions that may be construed as stream of commerce 
transactions: The first type is the stream of commerce through a private contract or a parent-
subsidiary transaction. The second type is the international stream of commerce.544 Asserting 
jurisdiction over the former type of stream of commerce cases are relatively easier to adjudicate in 
the State courts than the latter type. Hence, the stream of commerce and international stream of 
commerce require distinct and separate analysis.  
In stream of commerce cases, orb-web corporations are unlikely to be actual participants 
because these types of corporations often conduct their businesses, as discussed in Part II, to avoid 
any liability.545 Thus, an orb-web corporation’s contractual relationship and liability pursuant to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and similar State procedural rules) may be easily traceable 
and jurisdiction may be asserted, as discussed in Parts II and III.546 If a plaintiff can show the 
precise relationship of the defendant with the forum State or the United States, then most courts 
will likely assert jurisdiction. 547 
However, stream of commerce issues often arise not when there is an indirect effort to sell 
products through stream of commerce by foreign or multinational corporations, but when a large 
corporation or manufacturer or seller of goods distributes its goods through an extensive chain of 
distribution as commingled products or through intermediaries.548 To that end, there are two 
discernible schools of thought in the stream of commerce model.549 In the United States, interstate 
and international commerce are controlled by Congress and by the executive branch through 
various international treaties.550 Therefore, a State court’s assertion of jurisdiction in the stream of 
commerce cases require an alternative approach.  
 
B. The Stream of Commerce Model 
1. A Rise of Concept through a Private Contract or an Agency-Based  
 Transactions 
 
                                                 
543 See generally McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 873-92. 
544 See infra Part IV.C. 
545 See U.C.C. § 2-201, §2-106, § 2-103, §2-202, § 2-104, §2-207; see supra Part I.C. (diagram I). 
546 See discussion supra Parts I-III. 
547 Id.  
548 See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 926; see discussion supra Part I.C. 
549 See discussion infra Part IV.B.,C. 
550 U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 
 




Any transaction between two business entities often starts with a contract including simple 
“boilerplate contract terms,” including choice of law, warranty, trademark or licensing, and 
indemnification clauses.551 A stream of commerce theory was recognized, for the first time, by the 
Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.552 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs alleged that 
while they were driving their newly purchased car purchased from the defendants, it exploded and 
severely injured them.553 The plaintiffs brought a products-liability claim in Oklahoma State court 
against the defendants: (a) the automobile’s manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union 
Aktiengesellschaft (Audi); (b) its importer Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen); (c) its 
regional distributor, petitioner World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (World-Wide); and (d) its retail 
dealer, petitioner Seaway.554  
World-Wide was incorporated and had its principal place of business in New York, which 
distributed vehicles, parts, and accessories, under contract with Volkswagen, to retail dealers in 
New York and two other States.555 Seaway was incorporated and had its principal place of business 
in New York.556 The Court found that neither World-Wide nor Seaway did any business in 
Oklahoma, shipped or sold any products to or from that State, had an agent to receive process 
there, or purchased advertisements in any media calculated to reach the Oklahoma market.557 
Rather than looking at the defendants’ contractual relationship, the Court said that the corporate 
defendants, automobile wholesaler, and retailer did not carry any activity in Oklahoma and did not 
avail themselves of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law.558 The Court concluded that the 
defendants did not have the “minimum contacts” with Oklahoma sufficient to permit the Oklahoma 
courts to exercise jurisdiction even though the State long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction as 
permitted by the United States Constitution.559 The Court noted that the purpose of due process 
was to provide reasonableness and fairness to the defendants, but mere foreseeability was not 
enough.560  
There is no doubt that the stream of commerce notion explained in World-Wide 
Volkswagen was clearly meant to protect an orb-web corporation like World-wide Volkswagen 
                                                 
551 See generally BARBARA CHILD, DRAFTING LEGAL DOCUMENTS 112 (2nd ed.1992) 
552 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.  
553 Id. at 288. 
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558 See id. at 295. 
559 Id. at 289-90. 
560 Id.  
 
 
THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW   70 
 
and its affiliated entities.561 For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen, first, there was a contractual 
relationship between the parties, including the plaintiff, who purchased the defective the 
products.562 Second, the Court blended “the minimum contacts” analysis with purposeful 
availment and the assertion of jurisdiction through the presence model based on the relationship.563 
Third, the Court pointed out that uniformity was not permissible under the Commerce Clause, and 
the States were barred in asserting some economic activities.564 Fourth, the Court said that 
reasonableness factors could be asserted in the federal courts and not in the State courts, but the 
State court could adjudicate whatever was present within its sovereign.565 The last relevant point 
the Court made was that the plaintiff voluntarily traveled to and sued in Oklahoma, and the 
defendants did not sell any car in Oklahoma.566 These four arguments completely negate the goal 
of the minimum contacts model because the Court’s opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen had barred 
the States from exercising jurisdiction over out-of-State defendants that are not “present.”  
Under the stream of commerce theory, the Court held that the forum State was entitled to 
assert jurisdiction if “a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”567 Thus, the Court 
presented a new model, called the stream of commerce model, with a catch of “purposeful 
availment.”568   
 
2. Limitations Placed in Stream of Commerce Cases 
 
In the aftermath of World-Wide Volkswagen, many lower courts started to apply the stream 
of commerce analysis under the minimum contacts model.569 However, following the Court’s 
discussion of this rule, which  limited assertion of jurisdiction in the stream of commerce cases, 
                                                 
561 See supra diagram I. 
562 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 289 (“Seaway and World-Wide are fully independent corporations 
whose relations with each other and with Volkswagen and Audi are contractual only”). It is also likely that these 
defendants were contractually bound with the plaintiffs when they purchased the vehicle from these defendants. 
However, no one looked at the defendants’ relationship with the plaintiffs before asserting jurisdiction.  
563 See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 883 (“Since Asahi was decided, the courts have sought to reconcile the 
competing opinions”); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (describing purposeful availment is required in 
stream of commerce cases); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 114-116, 117-120 (describing a stream of 
commerce theory and stream of commerce plus theory). 
564 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (“whatever marginal revenues petitioners may receive by 
virtue of the fact that their products are capable of use in Oklahoma is far too attenuated a contact to justify that State's 
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them.”).  
565 See id. at 293-94.  
566 Id. at 295-96.  
567 Id. at 297-98.  
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subsequent cases had considerable opportunities to modify the rule.570 Nevertheless, the Court in 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. created two types of stream of commerce theories.571 These early cases 
raised differing conclusions, but a bar to these differing conclusions was only reached in McIntyre. 
McIntyre presents a great example of the States’ limitations of the stream of commerce 
theory.572 In McIntyre, the plaintiff brought a product liability action against McIntyre, a British 
manufacturer of a metal shearing machine, which severely injured the plaintiff’s hand while using 
the machine.573 The plaintiff was a New Jersey resident, was injured in New Jersey, and filed a 
case in New Jersey State court.574 New Jersey was a correct forum because the plaintiff was a 
resident of the state, and the injury occurred in that state, and the defendant delivered its defective 
product that state.575 Influenced by the Court’s decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, 
the lower courts found that jurisdiction could not be asserted under the presence or minimum 
contacts models but rather under the stream of commerce theory.576  
The Court, however, found against the plaintiff because he failed to establish a prima facie 
case that exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate against the foreign defendant.577 Viewed in this 
light, the State of New Jersey had an unusually powerful interest in providing a convenient forum 
for the injured plaintiff.578 The Court held that a non-resident defendant may “purposefully avail 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws…. But the general rule is inapplicable in this products-liability case, 
and the so-called ‘stream-of commerce’ doctrine cannot displace it.”579 The Court said that the 
Court’s decision in Asahi was responsible, in part, for the lower court’s decision to assert 
jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory.580  
                                                 
570 See cases cited in supra note 537. 
571 See generally discussion in Part IV. 
572 See supra Part. IV.A.B.1-4. 
573 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878-79. J. McIntyre officials attended annual conventions for the scrap recycling 
industry to advertise machines alongside its exclusive U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. (McIntyre 
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machine ended up in New Jersey, sold and directly delivered to the plaintiff by J. McIntyre. 
574 Id. (stating that the metal-shearing machine was manufactured by J. McIntyre, incorporated and operated 
in England)  
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Generally, product liability claims arise by businesses engaged in the stream of commerce 
through exclusive distributors.581 The Court’s approach in McIntyre undercuts the rationale that 
these non-resident, foreign corporations certainly had consented to be sued in the United States by 
specially targeting the United States market to sell their products.582 Arguably, one who sells its 
products in the United States and in the open market can be expected to be sued under an implied 
consent theory or a contract-based theory or an agency theory.583  
3. Abrogation of State Long-Arm Statutes 
 
Historically, State long-arm statutes were enacted in the wake of the Court’s decision in 
International Shoe and its progeny.584 In McIntyre, the New Jersey’s long-arm statute, Rule 4:4-
4(b)(1), granted jurisdiction to adjudicate cases involving a non-resident corporate defendant to 
the full extent permissible under the Constitution.585 Put this way, States’ long-arm statutes are 
enacted to provide access to their courts to enforce State laws.586 In McIntyre, the Court sets a 
ground that in products-liability cases, a defendant’s “purposeful availment” of the forum makes 
                                                 
581 Id. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a single market. Like 
most foreign manufacturers, it was concerned not with the prospect of suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but 
rather with its subjection to suit anywhere in the United States”); see supra discussion Part III.C.  
582 See supra notes 537-49 and accompanying text. 
583 See supra text and accompanying note 537; Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Mech. Am. Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 78-79 
(2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). The New Jersey Supreme Court 
noted that   
Those attending the scrap metal trade shows and conventions came from areas other than 
the cities hosting those events, and that the joint appearances by J. McIntyre and McIntyre America 
were calculated efforts to penetrate the overall American market. Plaintiff’s employer, a New Jersey 
businessman, is just one example of a person who traveled thousands of miles to a convention where, 
by dint of a sales effort, he purchased one of J. McIntyre’s machines. J. McIntyre may not have had 
access to McIntyre America’s customer list, but J. McIntyre knew or reasonably should have known 
that its machines were being sold in States other than Ohio and in cities other than where the trade 
conventions were held.  
J. McIntyre and McIntyre America shared a common name that may have suggested to 
unwitting members of the public some form of corporate relationship, despite the fact that both 
companies were independent business entities with different owners and management. The 
information sheet that accompanied the 640 Model Shear included J. McIntyre’s address and 
telephone number and, according to the New Jersey businessman who purchased that machine, “had 
we needed any repair parts, we would have called J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. in England, which is 
where we would call today for repairs or parts.” There can be little doubt that J. McIntyre and 
McIntyre America worked together to promote and sell J. McIntyre products in the United States as 
evidenced by their shared communications and joint participation at industry trade conventions.  
584 MILLER, supra note 39, at 51. 
585 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 902-03 (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (“When industrial accidents happen, a long-arm 
statute in the State where the injury occurs generally permits assertion of jurisdiction, upon giving proper notice, over 
the foreign manufacturer”). 
586 See infra notes 588-92 and accompanying text. 
 
 




jurisdiction consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”587 The Court’s 
requirement of purposeful availment of the forum, however, bypasses the statutory authority 
granted by the State legislatures.588  
The Court’s precise guideline in product liability cases continues to remain in some doubt. 
For example, the McIntyre Court noted that “a defendant’s placing goods into the stream of 
commerce “with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers within the forum State” 
may indicate purposeful availment.”589 The Court has advised that a defendant purposefully avails 
if he has an office in a forum State, pays taxes, owns a property in the forum, advertises or sends 
any employees to the forum.590 These requirements give little guidance for determining what 
constitutes “purposeful availment” and provide no guidance for determining whether a defendant 
targets advertising to or sells his products in all fifty states.   
Additionally, in Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., the Court held that “a corporation that engages 
in a nationwide course of conduct cannot be held accountable in a [S]tate court by a group of 
injured people unless all of those people were injured in the forum State.”591 Under the majority 
opinion, the Court made it very difficult for plaintiffs to sue a defendant unless the defendant also 
resides in the forum state.592 Thus, future mass tort action or steam of commerce cases will stand 
no chance at all.593  
In considering the propriety of a State versus a federal forum, the presumption is that the 
State courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction unless Congress has explicitly or implicitly reserved 
federal court jurisdiction.594 Viewed in the light of a State long-arm statute and “purposeful 
availment” in recent cases, the Court’s guidepost forbids the States to assert jurisdiction under the 
long-arm statutes and compromises the States’ sovereign interests and federalism.595  
                                                 
587 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 880. 
588 MILLER, supra note 39, at 51 (“State sovereignty involves the authority of a state to define and enforce 
its own laws. When a court considers state sovereignty in determining whether there is jurisdiction over a case, the 
court attempts to discern whether by deciding the case the court will promoting an interest the state has defined 
through its law”). 
589 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 298 (finding that in 
McIntyre that expectation was lacking)).  
590 Id. at 886-87. 
591 See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 U.S. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
592 See id.  
593 See id.  
594 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477 (1981) (Powell, J.,); see also McIntyre, 
564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(b) in federal-court suits, whether 
resting on diversity or federal-question jurisdiction, venue is proper in the judicial district ‘in which a substantial 
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred’”). 
595 Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 479 (citation omitted) (stating that “however, that the mere grant of 
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4. Abrogation of “Minimum Contacts” and “Specific Jurisdiction”  
 
As discussed earlier, recent cases point to the Court’s not committing itself to any formula 
in the stream of commerce cases. The Court summarized the law that “[i]f the defendant is a 
domestic domiciliary, the courts of its home State are available and can exercise general 
jurisdiction.”596 This means that an individual plaintiff must sue a corporate defendant in 
defendant’s home State, but if a plaintiff sues a non-resident defendant in the plaintiff’s home 
State, then “it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each State has sovereignty that is 
not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States. Furthermore, foreign corporations will often 
target or concentrate on States, subjecting them to specific jurisdiction in those forums.”597 The 
commission of certain “single or occasional acts” in a State may be sufficient to render a 
corporation answerable in that State with respect to those acts, though not with respect to matters 
unrelated to the forum connections.”598 These lines of arguments can be approached from another 
direction. Few would dispute the correctness of the argument that the defendant’s forum 
connection must not be a “single or occasional act,” but it must be “continuous and systematic 
contacts.” Thus, a plaintiff is required to establish “continuous and systematic contact with the 
forum State to justify “purposeful availment.”599 As a textual matter, failure to provide a forum is 
also said to infringe a plaintiff’s constitutional rights and the Court is not without notice of this 
fact.600     
C. The Stream of Commerce Model in International Transactions  
 
Modern advances in the transportation of products through the international stream of 
commerce makes it easier for a foreign corporation (or an orb-web corporation) to reach the United 
States markets. It seems reasonably clear that foreign corporations prefer to have their disputes 
resolved in their own courts unless they provide otherwise by contract. International stream of 
commerce analysis requires only a direct nexus between a cause and prejudice.601 For example, in 
a breach of contract between the two foreign entities, the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
                                                 
596 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion). 
597 Id.; but see Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 479. 
598 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion). 
599 See supra discussion Part I-II; McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 888.  
None of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind 
of sales effort indicated here is sufficient. Rather, this Court’s previous holdings suggest the 
contrary…. And the Court, in separate opinions, has strongly suggested that a single sale of a product 
in a State does not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and 
hoping) that such a sale will take place. Id.  
600 See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S at 894-910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
601 See infra notes 601-03 and accompanying text. 
 
 




for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) allows a contract to be proved in international trade 
court even if the contract was not in writing.602 
In addition, analogous to an individual’s entry into the United States, many federal statutes 
and federal agencies regulate entry of products into the United States for sale, and all imported 
products are subject to Department of Commerce jurisdiction.603 Agency determination under the 
Tariff Act of 1930 governs this area of law often through Court of International Trade.604 
International stream of commerce cases thus remain under the federal courts’ jurisdiction, followed 




Current personal jurisdiction models and courts’ analyses are inconsistent and unclear in 
litigation involving an orb-web corporation. The Court’s proposition is out of accord with the 
jurisprudence of clearly established theories or models. Under the rerouted approach argued in this 
article, orb-web corporations born in the United States and their foreign subsidiaries can be sued 
under the presence model, consistent with the United States Constitution. Likewise, foreign-born, 
orb-web corporations’ subsidiaries located in the United States can also be sued under the presence 
model as a domestic corporation. Additionally, in stream of commerce cases, jurisdiction may be 
asserted depending upon the tribunal’s fact-based determination as discussed above.  
This article argues that the rerouted approach of personal jurisdiction will not create new 
administrative burdens. Although these approaches may depart from the traditional minimum 
contacts model, the minimum contacts model no longer serves the purpose of jurisdictional law; 
rather, it creates confusion and wastes judicial resources. Therefore, in future cases, the minimum 
contacts analysis should be abrogated from jurisdictional analysis. Based on today’s corporate 
structures and forms, application of existing precedents stemming from the pre-industrial era are 
unfit and unconstitutional.   
 
 
                                                 
602 Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
603 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232-35 (2001) (showing that Congress governs this area 
of trade and has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to the U.S. trade policy).  
604 See 19 U.S.C. § 1605 et seq. 
605 A more thorough discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this article, apart from here 
distinguishing two types of stream of commerce cases discussed earlier.  
